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ABSTRACT
Ibrahim M. Waziri, Jr. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Packet Filter Perfor-
mance Monitor (Anti-DDoS Algorithm for Hybrid Topologies). Major Professors:
Victor Raskin & Julia Taylor.
DDoS attacks are increasingly becoming a major problem. According to Arbor
Networks, the largest DDoS attack reported by a respondent in 2015 was 500 Gbps.
Hacker News stated that the largest DDoS attack as of March 2016 was over 600
Gbps, and the attack targeted the entire BBC website.
With this increasing frequency and threat, and the average DDoS attack duration
at about 16 hours, we know for certain that DDoS attacks will not be going away any-
time soon. Commercial companies are not effectively providing mitigation techniques
against these attacks, considering that major corporations face the same challenges.
Current security appliances are not strong enough to handle the overwhelming traffic
that accompanies current DDoS attacks. There is also a limited research on solutions
to mitigate DDoS attacks. Therefore, there is a need for a means of mitigating DDoS
attacks in order to minimize downtime. One possible solution is for organizations to
implement their own architectures that are meant to mitigate DDoS attacks.
In this dissertation, we presented and implemented an architecture that utilizes
an activity monitor to change the states of firewalls based on their performance in
a hybrid network1. Both firewalls are connected inline. The monitor is mirrored to
monitor the firewall states. The monitor reroutes traffic when one of the firewalls
becomes overwhelmed due to a HTTP DDoS flooding attack. The monitor connects
to the API of both firewalls. The communication between the firewalls and monitor
is encrypted using AES, based on PyCrypto python implementation.
1A hybrid network is a network comprised of both hardware and virtual firewalls
xii
This dissertation is structured in three parts. The first part found the weakness
of the hardware firewall and determined its threshold based on spike and endurance
tests2. This was achieved by flooding the hardware firewall with HTTP packets until
the firewall became overwhelmed and unresponsive. The second part implements the
same test as the first, but targeted towards the virtual firewall. The same parameters,
test factors, and determinants were used; however a different load tester was utilized.
The final part was the implementation and design of the firewall performance monitor.
The main goal of the dissertation is to minimize downtime when network firewalls
are overwhelmed as a result of a DDoS attack.
2Memory & CPU Utilization were used as determinants
11. INTRODUCTION
Individuals and organizations store data either in their individual computers or orga-
nization servers. Networking allow users to share data with just a click. The internet
has revolutionized the communication world; it is a medium for data dissemination
and a means for collaboration and interaction between individuals via their comput-
ers, irrespective of geographical location. To ensure connectivity and ease of access
to information, two ways of storing information are in place: 1) using a physically -
accessible storage device or; 2) using a cloud service that connects remotely by using
the network.
One feature of networking is its capability to give access to the users connected
to that network. Without security measures in place, there would be no control
over access to information on a network. Now that the internet connects every elec-
tronic device to a single global network, ensuring data security has become a tremen-
dous challenge. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs), and other forms of attack are continuously increasing, according to Fortune
Magazine (Gandel, 2015) Cyber attacks cost companies $400 billion annually. An-
other report from CNN Money estimates that the average US firm spends at least $15
million a year on cyber crime (Griffiths, 2015). Current protection mechanisms are
inadequate to address the evolving cyber threats (Griffiths, 2015). Advancements in
our defense mechanisms cannot manage the current rate at which new cyber threats
arise (Griffiths, 2015).
Different appliances and defense methods are used to protect and ensure data
security within a network. However, as technology advances, so does the mechanisms
used to protect that particular technology. In networking and cloud computing we
incorporate traditional and virtual systems, which results in a hybrid network topol-
ogy (Buyya, Broberg, & Goscinski, 2010). For corporations and individuals to better
2secure data and information in a network, they need to implement different security
measures. One of the most integral aspect of network security implementation is the
deployment of a firewall (S. Ioannidis, Keromytis, Bellovin, & Smith, 2000).
Given the traditional and virtual network environments utilized by organizations,
the need arises for firewalls that protect both traditional and virtual environments.
It is a common practice to have a hardware firewall dedicated to the traditional net-
work, and a virtual firewall dedicated to the virtual network. The problem with
this implementation is the fact that different types of attacks can be implemented
within different network environments. If an attack is targeted towards a traditional
network, the virtual network gets affected, and vice-versa. For example, if a DDoS
attack targeted towards a dedicated traditional network firewall (hardware) is suc-
cessful, the firewall becomes non-responsive, therefore making the virtual network
non-responsive.
1.1 Motivation
In this section, we discuss why both hardware and virtual firewalls fail under
DDoS attacks in hybrid architectures. This is the reason that motivates us to build
a performance monitor that monitors the state of the firewalls.
1.1.1 Challenges with Traditional Packet Filter Architectures
Traditional (Hardware) firewall appliances are closed boxes that connect to the ex-
ternal network on one interface(s), and the internal network on the other interface(s).
Hardware firewalls have minimal operating systems, which makes them fast in terms
of processing capabilities. Optimal performance of hardware firewalls is dependent
upon the firewall’s resources, which include the CPU and Memory availability (Ken-
ney, 1996; Zalenski, 2002). Because of these factors, for a hardware firewall to function
as expected, it is required to have enough resources to process instructions (Panko,
2010).
3Denial of service attacks clogs up available resources (CPU, Memory, etc.) on a
target system, thereby overwhelming the system. Overwhelming a system causes it
to crash, reboot, or generally refuse any assistance to legitimate clients. DoS attack
are exceptionally basic; surely, pretty much every server will undoubtedly experience
such an attack sooner or later (Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004). In a situation where
the attack is facilitated crosswise over numerous hijacked systems (zombies) by an
attacker (master), the attack is referred to as DDoS (Carl, Kesidis, Brooks, & Rai,
2006; Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004). DDoS threats come in many varieties, some
of which target the underlying server infrastructure. Others exploit vulnerabilities
in applications and communication protocols. Unlike other kinds of cyber attacks
which are typically launched to establish a long-term foothold and hijack sensitive
information, denial of service assaults do not attempt to breach the security perimeter.
Rather, they attempt to make services, websites, and servers unavailable to legitimate
users. In some cases, however, DoS is also used as a smokescreen for other malicious
activities, and to dismantle security appliances (e.g., web application firewalls).
A successful DDoS attack is a highly noticeable event that impacts the entire
online user base (Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004). This makes a DDoS attack a popu-
lar weapon of choice for hacktivists, cyber vandals, extortionists, and anyone else
looking to make a point or champion a cause (Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004). DoS
assaults often last for days, weeks, or even months at a time, which makes them ex-
tremely destructive to any network. DDoS can cause loss of revenues, erode consumer
trust, force businesses to spend fortunes in compensations, and cause users to suffer
long-term reputation damage (Kenney, 1996; Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004; Thomas &
Stoddard, 2011).
Since the optimal operation of hardware firewalls is dependent on the firewall’s
available resources (Kenney, 1996). And DDoS are known to target and exhaust
resources. This makes hardware firewalls, among other devices, an attack target
(Byers, Rubin, & Kormann, 2004).
41.1.2 Challenges with Virtual Packet Filter Architectures
Network function virtualization (NFV) is a strategy to virtualize the network
functions carried out by proprietary dedicated hardware. NFV decreases the quantity
of proprietary hardware required to execute and run network services1. NFV allows
network operators to integrate middle-boxes in virtual machines (VM) and put those
VMs at subjective areas in the network (Anwer, Benson, Feamster, & Levin, 2015;
ESTI, n.d.).
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) has drawn noteworthy consideration from
both industry and the scholarly world with a vital movement within telecommunica-
tion service sector. By decoupling network functions (NFs) from the physical devices
from which they run, NFV can possibly result in significant reduction in operating
costs (OPEX) and capital costs (CAPEX), and to encourage the deployment of new
services with expanded agility and faster time-to-value (Mijumbi et al., 2015). NFV is
still in its earliest stages and there is a chance and opportunity for research groups to
create new models, frameworks, and applications, and to assess choices and trade-offs
in creating advance technologies for its optimized deployment.
NFV’s have their own security issues, which include hyperthreats and hypercalls,
as explained in (Shropshire, 2015). However, in this dissertation, we only focus on
security issues that arise from DDoS attacks. Considering that middle-boxes are
hardware appliances, they are expensive, hard to oversee, and their usefulness is hard
or difficult to change. NFV has alleviated all these problems, with its flexibility (Mar-
tins et al., 2014). Because virtualized network functions are deployed on dedicated
servers, which are hardware appliances, there is a need to secure the server appliances
used to virtualize NFs. One tool that is being used to secure such server appliance
perimeters is a hardware firewall.
1TechTarget - NFV defined
51.1.3 Challenges with Hybrid Packet Filters Architectures
A hybrid packet filter topology is required for a particular network architecture.
Traditional (hardware) firewall secures the NFV server’s perimeter, and the virtual-
ized firewall secures other virtualized network functions. One packet filter inherits
the problem of another packet filter (Buyya et al., 2010; Cheswick, Bellovin, & Rubin,
2003; Cisco, 2014).
Attacks that exhaust resources (such as DDoS) which are targeted towards the
hardware firewalls used to secure the virtualized network functions server results in
network downtime, and inaccessibility of anything connected inline beyond the firewall
(Kenney, 1996; Martins et al., 2014). If the hardware firewall is down, the server that
NFs runs on automatically becomes unavailable, and hence the unavailability of data
and network downtime.
1.2 Problem Statement
This dissertation aims to enhance packet filter performance in hybrid networks
and to minimize network downtime caused by DDoS attacks in hybrid packet filter
topologies. This is achieved by monitoring the CPU and memory utilization of dif-
ferent firewalls. To ensure that, we claim the following: it is possible to implement an
architecture that mitigates DDoS attacks, minimizes network downtime, and transfers
packet filtering service between firewalls in a hybrid network topology. We formulate
and validate the following hypotheses.
• It is possible to mitigate DDoS attacks on packet filters without dropping legit-
imate packets.
• It is possible to migrate packet filtering services interchangeably between fire-
walls in a hybrid packet filtering network when one firewall becomes over-
whelmed.
6• It is possible to develop a monitoring tool that monitors the CPU and Memory
states of firewalls and minimizes network downtime during a DDoS attack on a
network.
1.3 Contribution and Overview
The main contribution of this dissertation is to avoid network downtime as a result
of firewall failures during a DDoS attack in a hybrid network. To ensure that, we
implement a number of tests on the Traditional, Virtual, and Hybrid architectures
and also develop an algorithm used to validate the hypothesis mentioned above. We
provide here a brief overview of tests and algorithms:
1. Spike Performance Test
To find the threshold of the firewalls (both hardware and virtual), we carried
out a spike test that verifies the firewall’s stability amid a burst of simultaneous
concurrent or network connections to changing time periods and degrees of traf-
fic load. This happens as a result of an attack that overwhelms the device (such
as a DDoS attack). We implemented a HTTP flooding attack and monitored
CPU Utilization during this test.
2. Endurance Performance Test
Similar to the spike performance test, we carried out an endurance test. This
was implemented to discover whether the firewalls can withstand the necessary
processing loads for a long period of time. During the endurance test, we
implemented a HTTP flooding attack, and monitored the memory utilization
of the firewalls.
3. Performance Monitoring/Packet Filtering Transfer Algorithm
In light of the outcomes of our tests, we developed an algorithm that moni-
tors the states of the firewalls based on performance. The algorithm invokes
instructions when a newly defined threshold is reached. The algorithm also
7transfers packet filtering services between the firewalls when one of the firewalls
is overwhelmed. This results in more network up-time in the event of an at-
tack, and also ensures that the firewall does not become non-responsive when
overwhelmed.
1.4 Dissertation Road-map
This work introduces a new security architectural monitor used in hybrid networks.
The monitor works by transferring packet filtering services from one firewall to the
other when the network is under DDoS attack. The communication between the
monitor and the firewalls occurs through the firewall’s API. AES encryption algorithm
is used to ensure that all communication is secured.
In chapter 2, we review literature and research focused on network architectural
security, NFV’s, cyber threats (including DDoS attacks), and proposals for how DDoS
attacks can be mitigated. We then examined commercial DDoS mitigation solutions
that prevent and respond to flooding attacks. We finished the chapter by discussing
the disadvantages of using commercial DDoS mitigation providers, and how they do
not provide a substantive solution to DDoS attacks.
Chapter 3 discusses the traditional packet filter architecture. The chapter begins
with an introduction to firewalls, and discusses how hardware firewalls differ from
virtual firewalls. We then explained the problem statement and how we set up the
traditional architecture. We concluded the chapter by presenting the results of our
test.
Chapter 4 discusses the virtual packet filter architecture. We started by explaining
NFVs and current issues with virtualization. We highlight the problem statement and
explained our test parameters and results for the virtual architecture.
In chapter 5, we presented the packet filtering monitor/algorithm. We explained
the monitor’s design, how the monitor works, and evaluate the monitor’s performance.
8We concluded by summarizing our findings and proposing areas of future study in
Chapter 6.
1.5 Dissertation Limitations
To the best of our knowledge, no existing research explains how monitoring firewall
performance is used to mitigate DDoS attacks. This study focused only on Layer 7 -
application level DDoS attacks, primarily based on HTTP traffic. HTTP traffic is the
protocol utilized for communication between a client and a web server (Cisco, 2014;
Dieter, 1999). All tests were conducted in a controlled, monitored environment. The
virtualized firewall and the web server run on a dedicated server with configurations
that are explained in later chapters. This work focus on internal threats, with the
assumption that an intruder has gained access to the network. The process of gaining
access to networks is beyond the scope of this study. The network is configured
in IPv4 instead of IPv6 because IPv4 is the most generally utilized version of the
Internet Protocol (Bade & Vanduhe, n.d.) and IPv6 features (e.g. larger address
space, optimized DHCP, IPSec, optimized mobility feature (Bade & Vanduhe, n.d.))
are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The test focuses on mitigating the application layer DDoS attacks, which are
volumetric HTTP floods generated using different load and stress testing tools. The
HTTP floods targets firewalls not other network devices. This study is not limited to
specific vendors. The choice of devices used are solely based on availability, and the
same process can be applied to any other vendor devices. This dissertation focuses
on accessing a web server in which traffic must pass through two checkpoints (the
firewalls) before reaching its destination.
Lastly, this dissertation does not attempt to provide a guide for malicious activity.
We presented the report in an ethical manner, such that a reader cannot gain knowl-
edge of how to implement DDoS attacks. However, if this dissertation provides any
9hint that an adversary decides to implement or exploit, it is the sole responsibility of




As of July 2015, the internet has connected an estimated of 1.03 billion hosts
worldwide (ISC, 2015). The internet is an assembly of different networks accessible by
dissimilar users in different ways. That means that users can access information using
the internet regardless of national and geographical boundaries. This convenience and
ease of accessibility to information, however, comes with security issues. These issues
include, theft and tampering information. These issues make all information online
vulnerable to unauthorized access and usage.
One of the most important aspects of technology is whether it favors offense or
defense (R. Anderson, 2001). The difficulties of developing secure systems using a
penetrate-and-patch methodology have been familiar to the security community since
the Anderson report in the early 1970’s (J. P. Anderson, 1972).
Within recent years we have seen an expansion in the widespread adoption of com-
mercial security technologies by governmental, military and commercial organizations,
due to their convenience, and ease of use. With increasing reliance on third-party se-
curity resources, also comes an increasing vulnerability to information meant to be
protected (J. M. Anderson, 2003; Venter & Eloff, 2003). Although security threats
can range from psychological operations (social engineering) to physical attacks on
computers, one aspect of Information Security that most concerns computer users is
defending information against disruption or disabling the computerized functions and
resources that support an organization’s operations (Jajodia, Ammann, & McCollum,
1999).
Many of the threats to Information Security share common characteristics (Peltier,
2005). We are going to discuss some of the threats known today, but it is worthwhile
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mentioning that these threats do not represent a complete list of Information security
threats; considering new forms of attacks are discovered everyday. As it relates to
this dissertation; Information Security threats can be categorized as follows: External
and Internal.
• External Threats - This is the hacker threat, whether it is a single person, or
a nation state. This type of threat comes from external sources, someone not
connected to the network implements the attack. This types of attack includes
DDoS attack (Spears, 2006).
• Internal Threats - This is a type of threat that happens inside the network.
Internal threats do not only apply to malicious actives. User error and ignorance
play a large role in trusted individuals putting networks and systems at risk to
outside agents. Firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and other boundary
defense mechanisms are ineffective when circumvented by insiders.
2.2 Firewall Architectural/Implementation Security
Everyday new research is being conducted within the security field. Network se-
curity is among the top research theme in information technology. Z. Yang, Qiao,
Liu, Yang, and Wan (2010) focused on a collaborative trust model of firewall-through
based on cloud computing. In this research, existing trust models and firewall inno-
vation were studied. The researchers implemented a methodology using cloud com-
puting that assess dynamic setting and presents the meaning of risk sign in firewalls.
The model has three advantages: there are distinctive security strategies for vari-
ous domains, the model considers the exchange setting, the verifiable information of
entity dynamically impacts the estimation of trust worth. Finally, the trust model
is synchronous with the firewall and does not break the firewall’s local control poli-
cies. To confirm the dependability and accuracy of the proposed trust model, a test
is done. The test result demonstrates that the trust model is robust and surpasses
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ordinary trust models in different areas, because it effectively control unauthorized
access within cloud computing environment.
Moyer and Schultz (1996) presents an orderly approach for firewall penetration
testing that advances the perspective that firewall testing ought to look at not just
the capability of a firewall to stop attack from outside threats, but also the resistance
of the whole system that the firewall ensure against external threats. As a result,
therefore, testing should take an orderly approach to guarantee that it is complete,
and to decrease the risk of threats and/or interference to the system and its hosts.
This study introduced a requirement for an efficient approach to guide firewall testing.
Network firewalls, routers and switches utilize a rule database to choose which
packet will be permitted into and out of a network. By filtering packets, the fire-
wall, routers and switches can enhance security and execution. Be that as it may,
as the extent of the rule list builds, it gets hard to keep up and validate the rules
(Hazelhurst, Attar, & Sinnappan, 2000). Hazelhurst (2000) studied an algorithm for
analyzing firewall and router access lists. The algorithm is another representation of
rule list, and also a presentation of how Boolean expression can be utilized to analyze
rule sets. Eronen and Zitting (2001) presented an expert system for analyzing firewall
rules that looks into the problem of analyzing firewall configurations, using a tool that
comprehends Cisco access lists, it is actualized utilizing Eclipse, (a constraint logic
programming language). The study utilizes logic statements to express information
about networking, firewalls, and basic configuration mistakes. Configuring network
devices (especially from different vendors) to work in unison can be difficult. Notwith-
standing reverse-engineering or figuring out of existing setup is hard. To overcome
some of these difficulties, Mayer, Wool, and Ziskind (2000) studied a firewall analysis
algorithm that composed and actualized a novel firewall analysis tool. The tool per-
mits the administrator to effectively find and test the global firewall policy (either an
implemented policy or an arranged one). The tool utilizes an insignificant depiction of
the network topology, and specifically parses the different vendor-particular low-level
configuration list. It interfaces with the client through a query-and-answer session,
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which is done at a higher point of abstraction. A common question the apparatus
can answer is “from which machines can our DMZ be accessed, and with which im-
plementations?” The tool compliments existing vulnerability examination tools, as it
can be utilized before a policy is implemented. It works on a more justifiable level of
abstraction, and it manages all firewalls simultaneously (Mayer et al., 2000).
Firewalls and routers must perform packet classifications at high speeds to produc-
tively execute their capacities, for example, firewalls and diffserv. Arrangement can
be found on a self-assertive number of fields in the packet header. Rapidly classifying
an arbitrary number of fields is known to be hard, and has a poor scenario complexity.
Qiu, Varghese, and Suri (2001) analyzes two fundamental approaches; backtracking
search and set pruning attempts. The researchers propose several new techniques to
assist and enhance the two fundamental approaches, including: backtracking search
using small memory utilization, a novel compression algorithm, pipe-lining the in-
quiry, and trading-off easily amongst backtracking and set pruning. The research
quantifies the performance gains for every approach utilizing actual databases. The
study demonstrates that on actual firewall databases, the schemes with the advance-
ments are ideal in time and capacity.
Guillen, Sossa, and Estupin˜a´n (2012) demonstrates how performance results be-
tween closed and open source routing approaches are vital parameters for network
architects. The study breaks down execution in convergence time, throughput and de-
lay between routing approaches in view of virtual software router (VSR) and routing
approaches in view of proprietary hardware routers (PHR). The outcome demon-
strates that VSR have better convergence times compared to hardware routers and
the throughput performance is better on PHR. Waziri Jr, Mirzoev, and Shropshire
(2014) looked into the comparison of control and hardware based filtering architec-
tures in order to identify the most effective architecture, a control test with no firewall
was conducted, followed by a hardware based packet filtering architecture. The study
used HTTP packets generated by a load testing tool. The results focused mainly on
endurance and the spike tests for the two architectures.
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Sheth and Thakker (2011) did a comparative research that evaluates different
types of firewall operation, the operational conditions and performance results of
shortcomings in firewall operations. Moreover, the study analyzes reported issues
with existing firewalls. Detailed analysis and correlation is done in terms of cost,
security, operational ease, and execution of open source packet filter (PF) firewall,
checkpoint SPLAT, and Cisco ASA in a testing environment with laboratory gener-
ated monitored and controlled traffic. Different throughputs and connection statistics
were utilized as benchmark for performance comparison. The outcomes showed that
Cisco ASA outperforms other firewalls in terms of performance. Checkpoint SPLAT
and OpenBSD PF likewise gives sensibly competitive performances.
Conventional firewalls depend on topology restrictions and controlled network to
implement traffic filtering. Firewalls can’t filter unidentified packets, so all clients on
the internal side are trusted. While this model has functioned admirably for little to
medium size networks, networking advancements, for example, expanded availability,
higher line speeds, extranets, and working from home undermine and make access
control out of date. To address the issue of traditional firewalls, the idea of distributed
firewalls has been proposed. In this plan, security policy is still centrally defined,
however implementation is left to the individual endpoints. IPSec might be utilized
to convey credentials that express parts of the overall network policy. On the other
hand, the credentials might be obtained through out-of-band means. S. Ioannidis et
al. (2000) presents the implementation and design of a distributed firewall based on
KeyNote trust management system and OpenBSD1 to specify, distribute and resolve
policy.
Firewalls are important tools for securing private networks. Be that as it may, by
just deploying firewalls, administrators are a long way from securing their networks.
Bad configurations results in breaches and network vulnerabilities. Specifically, con-
flicting filtering rules leads to blocking legitimate traffic or allowing undesirable pack-
ets. Abbes, Bouhoula, and Rusinowitch (2008) shows another characterization strat-
1An open source UNIX operating system
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egy to recognize conflicting access rules inside a firewall. The technique forms an
arrangement of filtering rules that have a variable number of fields. A field has a
scope of values, represented by an internal or variable length bit string that may
cross with relating field scope of different rules. Keeping in mind the end goal is to
recognize overlaps, the study sorted out the states of each filtering rule in a manner
that can rapidly isolate colliding rules.
Lihua, Jianning, and Zhendong (2006) presents a static analysis tool for firewall
modeling and analysis by regarding firewall configurations as important programs.
The tool applies static analysis methods to check misconfiguration, for example, vi-
olation of policies, irregularities, and inefficiencies in individual firewalls and among
distributed firewalls. Firewalls performs typical model checking of the firewall designs
for all conceivable IP packets along every single conceivable data paths. Typical model
checking is both sound and complete due to the limited way of firewall configurations.
The tool is actualized by modeling firewall rules utilizing binary decision diagrams
which have been utilized effectively as part of the hardware verification and model
checking. The tool is utilized to reveal several real misconfiguration in networks, some
of which have been confirmed and amended by network administrators.
Chomsiri and Pornavalai (2006) proposes a strategy to analyze the firewall rule-set
or policy using relational algebra and a raining 2D-Box model. Rules analysis can
find every one of the abnormalities in the firewall rule-set in the way that is typi-
cally utilized by numerous firewall devices, like, Cisco Access Control List, Iptables,
IPchains, or Check Point Firewall-1. While the current analyzing strategies consider
the peculiarities between any two rules in the firewall rule-set, researchers consider
more than two rules together in the meantime to find the abnormality. In this way,
it is conceivable to find the hidden anomalies in the firewall rule-set. Analysis re-
sults can be utilized with the proposed rules-combination technique displayed in the
research to minimize the firewall rule without changing the policy. At the end, the
research developed an application based on the proposed analyzing strategy. The
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application could help administrators examine and adjust a complex firewall policy
with fewer mistakes.
Until recently, the causes of decreased effectiveness and restricted usage of new
security frameworks have been the inadequate execution of hardware that executes
access control, difficult analysis, and a configuration that conforms to corporate se-
curity policy requirements. Without the utilization of specific solutions that permit
effective functioning of data security systems and their coordination with other net-
work applications, a secured corporate network infrastructure is impossible to achieve.
Zaborovsky and Titov (2009) issue is considered from three points of view: the deci-
sion of the distributed hardware platform to enhance firewall performance; the por-
trayal of security approach by method for an organization-based access control mode;
and automating the process of firewall rules formation taking into account high-level
depiction of access policy requirements.
Kayssi, Harik, Ferzli, and Fawaz (2000) presents a firewall plan for IP networks
utilizing a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). The FPGA actualizes, accepts, or
denies rules of the firewall. A hardware-based firewall offers the benefit of speed rate
over a software firewall, notwithstanding direct interfacing with network devices, for
example, an Ethernet. The research indicates how the rules are translated to VHDL
and then implemented in hardware, and how the hardware is used to filter network
traffic in a packet-by-packet method, or based on connecting information, with speeds
of more than 500,000 packets per second (Kayssi et al., 2000).
Golnabi, Min, Khan, and Al-Shaer (2006) shows an arrangement of techniques
and algorithms to examine and oversee firewall policy rules: (1) data mining tech-
niques to deduce effective firewall policy rules by mining the traffic log based on its
frequency; (2) filtering-rule speculation to decrease the quantity of approach rules
by generalization: and (3) a procedure to recognize any obsolete rule and a set of
couple predominant rules, to create another arrangement of efficient firewall policy
rules. Anomaly detection based on mining uncovered numerous hidden abnormalities
by analyzing the firewall policy rules, bringing about two new sorts of anomalies. As
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a result of these systems, network security administrators can consequently review
and update the rules.
From every one of these studies, we understand how a firewall is the effective
innovation of today’s network security defense; we also understood how maintaining
firewall rules is complex, error-prone, expensive and ineffective for large networks.
These firewall rules are generally custom-designed and handwritten; as a result, they
are in consistent need of tuning and approval, because of the dynamic way of network
traffic, constant changing network environment, and its market demands.
2.3 Network Security/Function Virtualization
Networks are deployed to make computers more accessible to the outside world.
Making computers more accessible to the outside world is a mixed blessing (Dieter,
1999). More interactions are possible, but so are unwelcome interactions. One may
therefore wish to control how users are able to connect to a network system, how
users on the network access data, and how data is protected when it travels through
the network.
Networks are the communication infrastructure of data transmission between
nodes in a distributed system. Data meant to be sent by an application in one node
has to be prepared for transport, transmitted as a sequence of electronic or optical
signals, reassembled, and presented to an application program at the receiver’s end.
Network protocols have to find a route from sender to receiver; they have to deal
with the loss or corruption of data, and also with the loss of connection. It is a good
practice to address these concerns one at a time with a layered architecture, applica-
tion protocols at the top, and protocols that physically transmit bits of information
to the bottom.
Network management protocols provide the necessary support so that the data
generated by other protocols are efficiently delivered to the intended recipients. Man-
agement protocols, for example, may check the availability of intermediate nodes
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between sender and receiver, find optimal connections, or resolve logical network ad-
dresses to physical addresses. Other protocols are used to remotely configure network
nodes, the software running on these nodes are becoming more and more complex.
Hence, network security increasingly relies on securing management protocols and
nodes in the network. The fact that network nodes are located in protected sites is
no longer a guarantee for security (Dieter, 1999).
“Network security refers to any activity designed to protect a network, specifically,
these activities protect the usability, reliability, integrity and safety of a network and
data. Effective network security targets a variety of threats and stops them from
entering or spreading on a network” (Cisco, 2014).
Regardless of whether a company is on the Internet or not, security measures must
be applied to the network. These security measures may be as simple as requiring
users to regularly change their passwords or may involve using the network operating
system and third-party utilities to restrict access and enforce policies (Blacharski,
1998).
Issues in Security
Since the advent of computers and networking, different forms of cyber attacks
have been in place. Common attack techniques are classified: Some attackers gain
system knowledge or personal information, such as, spying and phishing. Others
meddle with system designated functions, for example, virus infections, worms and
Trojans. Also, others exhaust the system resources rendering rendering services un-
available. This can be brought about by denial of service (DoS) attack. Different
types of network interruptions also exist, for example, land attacks, smurf attacks,
password stealing, social engineering, use of viruses and worms, bugs & indirect ac-
cesses, verification & protocol failures, information leakage, bot-nets, eavesdropping,
data modification, spoofing, sniffing, software & hardware misuse, TCP hijacking,
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teardrop attacks and so on (Bhavya, 2008). For the purpose of this study, we are
going to focus only on the DoS form of attack.
Considerable research has been completed lately towards virtualization and cloud
security. With server combination and desktop virtualization, essentially more ac-
tivity stays inside the data center racks, prompting blind spots in network security
appliances. Current network security devices, designed in view of scale-up standards,
can’t keep pace with the expanded bandwidth dispensed to the servers, and the ex-
panding volume of threats at all layers of the network stack. Likewise, high versatile
workloads and expanding intelligence in the virtual and hypervisor layer makes it pro-
gressively hard for static network devices to interlock with dynamic policy changes
and on-the-fly re-purposing of resources to serve different workloads, applications, or
clients.
The researchers Basak, Toshniwal, Maskalik, and Sequeira (2010) highlights an-
other pattern in the industry to virtualize network security devices inside security
virtual appliances (SVA’s), which can then be placed on hosts, and other distributed
security function for network flows across the cluster. The methodology replaces sin-
gle choke-point based physical security devices like firewalls. IP address management,
flow monitoring, and data leakage are monitored using a distributed virtual counter-
parts running on slices of x86, integrated with compute workloads, with the capacity
to take advantage of traffic going through all virtual machines. Cloud computing
can convey both software and hardware as on-demand assets and services over the
internet (Huang & Yang, 2010). Without a doubt, one of the noteworthy concerns in
cloud computing is security.
Wu, Ding, Winer, and Yao (2010) focused on security of virtual networks in vir-
tualized environments. The research presents an outline of security issues in virtual
machines. The issues that exist in a virtual network are additionally being discussed
and analyzed based on Xen platform. The outcome displays an inventive virtual net-
work structure planned to control the intercommunication among virtual machines
incorporated to physical machines with higher security. With distributed systems
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becoming more prevalent in modern computing, there is a need to scale exponen-
tially with their use and integration. Up to this point, the x86 architecture does not
allowed traditional trap-and-emulate virtualization. x86 virtual machine monitors
have rather utilized parallel interpretation of the guest kernel code. Be that as it
may, both intel and AMD have now introduced architectural extensions to support
classical virtualization. The research “comparison of software and hardware methods
for x86 virtualization” compares a current software VMM and another VMM intended
for emerging hardware support. Surprisingly, the hardware VMM frequently shows
lower performance than the software VMM.
Adams and Agesen (2006) conducted a study of software and hardware techniques
for x86 virtualization and studied architectural level events such as page table over-
hauls, context switches, and I/O; the study discovered their cost incomprehensibly
distinctive among native software VMM, and hardware VMM execution. The re-
search results demonstrates that the hardware support neglects to give a recognizable
performance advantages for two primary reasons. First, it offers no support for MMU
virtualization; second, it neglects to exist with existing software techniques for MMU
virtualization. The study looks ahead to developing methods for addressing the MMU
virtualization issue with regards to hardware-assisted virtualization.
Manohar (2013) surveyed virtualization techniques, types of hypervisors, and
building private clouds with virtualization. It additionally examines the security
of cloud computing and introduced the optical network as an access network and
its devices in the data centers as energy efficient centers. Virtualization assumes a
noteworthy part in helping organizations reduce cost, and in the mean time guaran-
tees enhanced productivity, better utilization, and adaptability of existing hardware.
Reuben (2007) presents a literature on different security issues inside virtualization
technologies. The study mainly focuses on open security vulnerabilities that virtual-
ization conveys to the cyber environment. The study focused on security issues that
are unique for virtual machines and security threats that are common to all virtu-
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alization technologies available in the market. The study finishes up with a several
discourse of a few security vulnerabilities in the virtualized environment.
2.4 Cyber Threats Implementation
Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) is a noticeable threat to cloud and
virtualized environments. Traditional defense approaches cannot be easily applied
to the cloud environment because of their moderately low proficiency and large data
space. Thus, (Dou, Chen, & Chen, 2013) exhibited a Confidence-Based Filtering
strategy (CBF). The research method is deployed in two periods; the non-attack
period, and the attack period. More specifically, legitimate packets are gathered amid
the non-attack period for extracting attribute pairs to produce a nominal profile. The
CBF technique is advanced by computing the score of a specific packet amid the attack
time frame to decide whether to discard it. In conclusion, extensive simulations are
conducted to assess the feasibility of the CBF method. The outcome demonstrates
that CBF has a high scoring speed, small storage requirement and an acceptable
filtering precision, making it suitable for real-time filtering in cloud environment.
Negi, Mishra, and Gupta (2013) proposes an enhanced CBF approach featuring
a modification to the confidence-based filtering technique researched for the cloud
computing environment. It took into account connection designs that mitigate DDoS
attacks in the cloud. The modification presents additional bandwidth and tries to
increase the processing speed of victim’s server.
Farahmandian et al. (2013) reviewed and compared the existing methods used to
mitigate DDoS attacks on cloud computing. SYN flooding attacks are an example
of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Early detection is desirable however
traditional passive detection strategies are done in the early stages because of their
dependence on passive sniffing an attacking signature. Xiao, Chen, He, and Sha
(2005) captures attacking signatures utilizing an active probing scheme that obtains
the delay of routers by sending packets containing a unique Time-to-Live set for the
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IP headers. The aftereffects of the test are utilized to perform SYN flooding detection,
which is reliable and has minimal overhead. This methodology is more independent
than different techniques that require the participation of network devices. Different
tests demonstrate that this delay probing approach accurately recognizes half-open
connections caused by SYN flooding attacks from those emerging from different causes
at an early stage. The researchers Lonea, Popescu, and Tianfield (2013) focused on
detecting DDoS attack in cloud computing environments. The proposed solution is to
consolidate the evidence obtained from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in
the virtual machines of the cloud systems with a data fusion methodology on the front
end. In particular, when the attack appears, the VM-based IDS will yield alarms,
which will be stored in the MySQL database set inside the Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU)
of the front end server. The research propose a quantitative solution for analyzing
alerts generated by the IDSs, utilizing the Dempsters Combination Theory (DST)
operations in 3-valued rationale and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the mentioned
flooding attacks. At the last step, the solution utilizes the Dempsters combination
rule to fuse evidence from multiple independent sources.
On the topic of DDoS detection, H. Wang, Zhang, and Shin (2002) proposes a
simple and vigorous mechanism for detecting SYN flooding attacks. Rather than
monitoring traffic flow at the front (like firewall or proxy) of a server, they identify
the SYN flooding attacks of LEAF routers that connects end hosts to the Inter-
net. The ease of the detection mechanism lies in the stateless and low computation
overhead, which makes the detection mechanism itself immune to flooding attacks.
The detection mechanism depends on the protocol behavior of TCP SYN-FIN (RST)
pairs, and is an instance of successive change point detection. To make the detection
mechanism insensitive to site and access pattern, a non-parametric cumulative sum
method is applied, thus, making the detection component for the most part relevant
and its deployment much less demanding. The efficiency of this detection component
is validated by trace-driven simulations. The evaluation results show that the detec-
tion mechanism has short detection precision. Because of its closeness to the flood-
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ing sources, the component not only sets alarm upon detection of continuous SYN
flooding attacks, additionally it uncovers the location of the flooding sources without
resorting to expensive IP trace-back. There have been numerous proposals to shield
against SYN flooding, and some require notable TCP changes. A few arrangements
that endeavor to determine the TCP shortcoming are now publicly available. Ric-
ciulli, Lincoln, and Kakkar (1999) subjectively analyzes these arrangements of TCP
SYN flooding defense. The study refines the analysis of the random drop approach
and drives a straightforward and general approach to enhance its performance. At
last, the study presents (through both analytical and packet-level simulations) the
efficacy of the random drop approach in a variety of operating conditions.
TCP-based flooding attacks are a typical type of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks that abuse network resources and can result in serious threats to
the Internet (Chen & Yeung, 2006). Incorporating IP spoofing-random, subnet, and
fixed varieties makes it harder to shield against attacks. Subnet-spoofing is the most
troublesome type of DDoS to counteract. Chen and Yeung (2006) proposed a simple
and efficient method to detect and protect against TCP SYN flooding attacks under
various IP spoofing types, including subnet spoofing. The method makes use of a
capacity efficient data structure and change-point detection method to distinguish
complete three-way TCP handshakes from incomplete ones. Simulation experiments
reliably demonstrate that the strategy is both productive and compelling in protecting
against TCP-based flooding attacks under various IP spoofing types.
Shin, Kim, and Jang (2005) proposes D-SAT: detecting SYN flooding attack by
two-stage statistical approach. A basic and robust way to detect SYN flooding attacks
is by monitoring the network activity. Rather than dealing with all ongoing traffic
on the network, D-SAT only monitors SYN count and the proportion between SYN
and other TCP packets. D-SAT identifies SYN flooding and discovers victims more
precisely in its second stage. To make the recognition mechanism and detection more
easy, D-SAT utilizes a cumulative sum methodology in statistical process control. It
makes the recognition mechanism more applicable and easier to implement. D-SAT
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additionally uses AFM (Aggregation Flow Management) to identify victims quickly
and precisely. The trace-driven simulation results shows that D-SAT system is reliable
and easy to deploy and D-SAT also demonstrate that it recognizes SYN flooding
precisely and finds attack within a short detection time.
Denial of Service
A denial of service (DoS) attack is an attack that clogs up so much resources
(CPU, Memory etc) from the target system. This usually causes the system to crash,
reboot, or generally deny any services to legitimate clients. DoS attacks are extremely
normal; to be certain, every server can undoubtedly experience such an attack at any
given time. In a situation where the attack is coordinated across many hijacked
system (zombies) by a single attacker (master), the attack is referred to as DDoS
(Carl et al., 2006). DDoS threats come in many varieties, some of which target the
underlying server infrastructure. Others exploit vulnerabilities in applications and
communication protocols. Unlike other kind of cyberattacks, DDoS are typically
launched to establish a long-term foothold and hijack sensitive information. Denial
of service assaults do not attempt to breach your security perimeter. Rather, they
attempt to make your services, website, and servers unavailable to legitimate users. In
some cases, however, DoS is also used as a smokescreen for other malicious activities,
or to take down security appliances (e.g., web application firewalls).
Classification of Denial of Service
DoS attacks can be classified into five categories (Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004).
These categories are: Network Device level, OS level, Application level, Data Flood,
and Protocol Feature attack.
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Fig. 2.1. DoS & DDoS Attack Types
Fig. 2.2. Classification of DoS attacks
Network Layer Attacks - Layer 3 DoS
A DoS attack at the network level is caused either by exploiting a bug, software
vulnerability, or exhausting the hardware resources of the network device (Waziri Jr
& Shropshire, 2015).
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Layer 3 attacks utilize specialized packets designed to cause resource intensive
processing, slow response on target devices, or the disruption of TCP state informa-
tion. These attacks influence issues in Layer 3 protocols and devices in order to cause
significant disruption with much less attacker bandwidth than a volumetric attack.
It is moderately simple; nonetheless, one needs to filter most Layer 3 attacks as they
can be filtered with simple signatures and usually consume much less bandwidth than
a pure volumetric attack (Waziri Jr & Shropshire, 2015).
Attack vectors in this category include UDP flood, SYN flood, NTP amplifica-
tion, DNS amplification, and more. Any of these can be used to prevent access to
servers, while also causing severe operational damages, such as account suspension
and massive overage charges.
DDoS attacks are almost always high-traffic events, commonly measured in giga-
bits per second (Gbps) or packets per second (Pps). A large network layer assault
can exceed 600 Gbps 2; however, 20 to 40 Gbps are enough to completely shut down
most network infrastructures.
Application Layer Attacks - Layer 7 DoS
DoS attacks at this level attempt to make a machine or service out of order either
by exploiting particular bugs in network applications that are running on the target
host or by utilizing such applications to deplete the resources of the victim. An
example of this is the finger-bomb.
Layer 7 attacks exploit application layer commands that cause slow processing
or crashes with the goal of disrupting the service of a targeted application. Layer 7
attacks normally target HTTP; either HTTP request that cause the web application
to perform resource exhaustive processing or vulnerability in unpatched versions of
the web servers. These attacks are considerably more hard to profile and filter at the
network, and frequently require changes to web applications themselves. Basic Layer
2Arbor Network Report 2015
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7 attacks include Slowlirs, R-U-Dead-Yet, and XDoS (zadjmool, 2013). Among other
attack vectors in this category includes HTTP floods, slow attacks (e.g., Slowloris or
RUDY), and DNS query flood attacks.
The size of application layer attacks is normally measured in request per second
(Rps), with no more than 50 to 100 Rps required to exhaust most average sized
websites (Davidowicz, 1999). In this dissertation, we implemented this type of attack.
Motivation & Causes
The purposes of DDoS attacks vary. A small percentage (on the positive side) of
them can be accidental, caused by a badly configured system or as a demonstration
to potential customers of DDoS protection solutions. However, on the negative side;
there is often a personal intention behind the majority of these attacks. Some can
be used as a diversion for attackers who want to try and steal information from
certain systems, or for financial market manipulation or even fame, because hackers
might want to boast that they managed to successfully attack a well known target or
competitor. Moreover, online gaming, gambling, and social network related reasons
are also motives behind such attacks. One of the biggest motivations behind DDoS
attacks is “hacktivism”. Hacktivism is mainly driven by political and ideological
disputes.
Severity
The biggest attack reported by a respondent in 2015 was 500 Gbps, with different
respondents reporting attacks of 450 Gbps, 425 Gbps, and 337 Gbps. This proceeds
with the pattern of significant development in the top-end size of DDoS attacks year-
after-year. In 2014, 20 percent of respondents reported attacks of more than 50 Gbps.
Interestingly in 2015 about one-fourth of the same respondents report attack sizes of
more than 100 Gbps, stressing the scale of the DDoS problem. Clients remain the
main focus in more than 66% of DDoS attacks. Once more, the extent of respondents
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seeing attacks focusing on cloud-based service has increased from 19% in 2013, to
29% in 2014, and to 33% in 2015.
Fig. 2.3. DDoS Peak Attack Size Year after Year
Attackers have proceeded with the 2014 pattern of utilizing reflection/amplification
strategies to exploit vulnerabilities in NTP, SSDP, and different protocols. Numerous
respondents reported events at 200+ Gbps. This continues the trend of significant
growth in the top-end size of DDoS attacks yearly.
Implementation
For DoS attacks to be implemented, an attack needs to be perpetrated towards the
target. Depending on the type of victim, there are different forms of DoS attacks. For
ethical reasons, this dissertation does not provide a guide on how to implement DoS
attacks; however we presented the different forms of attacks as follows (Mirkovic &
Reiher, 2004): UDP Flood, ICMP (Ping) Flood, SYN Flood, Ping of Death, Slowloris,
NTP Amplification, HTTP Flood, etc.
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HTTP Flood Attack
HTTP Flooding is an application layer attack. It overwhelms a target web server
with a substantial amount of HTTP requests (Byers et al., 2004; Estevez-Tapiador,
Garc´ıa-Teodoro, & Dı´az-Verdejo, 2005), slowing or completely disrupting the regular
web server traffic (Das, Sharma, & Bhattacharyya, 2011). In this dissertation, we
implement a HTTP Flood attack. During this attack, an attacker exploits the HTTP
GET or POST request sent when a HTTP client, like a web browser, talks to an
application or server.
The attacker uses a botnet to send the victim’s server a large amount of GET (pic-
tures or scripts) or POST (file or forms) request with the expectation of overwhelming
its resources and capabilities. The victims web server gets inundated, attempting to
answer every request from the botnet, which drives it to allocate its maximum re-
sources to handle the traffic. This prevents legitimate requests from reaching the
server, causing a denial of service.
2.5 Commercial DDoS Defense Architectures
As a result of the various DDoS targets, types of attacks and severity, it is neces-
sary to have methods to mitigate these attacks and help secure the availability of crit-
ical services. Nowadays, there are different popular commercial mitigation/protection
providers that attempt to accomplish the problem posed by DDoS attacks. However,
most commercial providers do not successfully achieve their stated goals. Commercial
mitigation providers can provide a high detection success rate, but they tend to be
very costly depending on the size of the attack traffic; also, they tend to have is-
sues with clients regarding traffic being routed to the providers, which violates client
privacy.
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Fig. 2.4. HTTP GET & POST Flood Attack
2.5.1 Mitigation Approach
Discarding traffic altogether is not considered a mitigation practice, considering
that legitimate traffic can also be dismissed. An Access Control List of firewalls is a
choice for protection; however, this is only successful in filtering already known attacks
by examining the protocols used. DDoS attacks are becoming more sophisticated,
using valid protocols, and rendering the filtering process unsuccessful when it comes
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to SYN, SYN/ACK, and others forms of DDoS attacks. Another way of using routers
as a form of protection is to use Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF), which
can be used to block IP addresses outside of the target’s subnet. Nonetheless, if an
attacker utilizes spoofed IP addresses from the same subnet, little to nothing can be
done. Also, legitimate end-user traffic is blocked and the DDoS attack succeeds.
According to Cisco, another popular opinion is that firewalls and Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDS) are inadequate forms of protection against DDoS attacks (Cisco,
2004). Firewalls are used inline and attackers target their low session handling abil-
ities. Usually, they do not filter spoofed traffic and they can also be used to reject
traffic from certain protocols. However, the attacking side can still use valid protocols
during a DDoS attack. The same applies to IDS; they can provide excellent detection
for Application Layer attacks but not against valid protocols. Moreover, as the term
suggests, IDSs only function as a detection mechanism.
2.5.2 Mitigation Techniques
Contrary to privacy issues, commercial solutions have a high success rate in mit-
igation. Such companies offer different types of plans according to clients’ needs
and budgets. Services such as prevention, monitoring and traffic handling can be
provided. There are mainly two different types of traffic handling correlated to the
layers of attack; Layer 3/4 and Layer 7 solutions (Incapsula, 2014).
Layer 3/4 mitigation techniques are based on Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
IP address range swings. The target of the DDoS attack can decide to stop announc-
ing their IP address range to the global Internet; in turn, that particular company
announces it for them, so that they receive all of the traffic intended for the client,
whether it is malicious or not. This operates in a distributed model with data cen-
ters across the world; traffic is then washed as it goes through special purpose built
appliances to filter illegitimate traffic out with the use of specific algorithms. Once
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the traffic is washed it is rerouted back to the client (On-Ramping) over a Generic
Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel.
Layer 7 mitigation techniques also function in a distributed model. By having
multiple data centers at different Internet Exchanges, clients can point the DNS entry
of their websites to these companies who, in return, handle the requests where each
packet is inspected. Based on the signatures, illegitimate traffic can be detected and
discarded. Next, legitimate traffic is sent back to end-user browsers based on their
geographical location.
Fig. 2.5. Commercial-Based DDoS Mitigation Technique
Due to the immense amount of available bandwidth, both legitimate and malicious
traffic is accepted. The traffic is then washed using algorithms to examine which
packet protocols are used. The DDoS traffic is discarded and the legitimate traffic is
sent to the Critical Service Infrastructure and returned to the end-users.
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2.5.3 Drawbacks of Commercial Solutions
Few commercial mitigation techniques prove to be efficient; many are imperfect,
and also depending on the customer, they can be quite expensive (Verisign, 2014a).
First and foremost, the algorithms used to monitor traffic are not flawless, which
means that along with DDoS traffic, sometimes legitimate traffic is discarded. These
mitigation solutions offer DDoS detection and contact the client when they detect a
significant rise in their traffic to ask if they should take measures (Agarwal, Dawson,
& Tryfonas, 2003). Up to thirty minutes can pass after the detection has provided
results and the BCP swing of the IP range has taken place, during which the victim
is under attack and unable to react (Verisign, 2014b).
Application Layer solutions have a different disadvantage. Because of their dis-
tributed model which can have a replica of the client’s web service in any of their
data centers, it is rather unsafe to use for services that implement SSL due to the fact
that the Private Keys need to be shared. For small customers, this might not be an
issue; however, when customers are financial and governmental organization, privacy
issues are far more consequential. Recently a solution to this problem was developed
(CloudFlare, n.d.) which tries to provide a mitigation solution without sharing Pri-
vate Keys. Nevertheless, the matter of privacy still remains when bringing a third
party into the equation. End-users of critical services trust that their financial and
private data is handled by an entity that is stable and impermeable.
Lastly, these companies offer contracts based on bandwidth. If a customer, for ex-
ample, chooses for contract of mitigating attacks of up to 40 Gbps and it is attacked
by a larger DDoS attack than the terms of the contract, the prices of mitigation
increase excessively. According to security firm Imperva, sixty percent of US com-
panies experienced DDoS attacks during 2013. DDoS mitigation solutions can cost
from $5,000 to over $100,000 US dollars per hour (Incapsula, n.d.). Furthermore,
these figures do not include possible damages to credibility and customer satisfac-
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tion. The consequences of a DDoS attack can thus be disastrous for any organization
or company.
2.5.4 Prevention & Response
The primary line of defense is to ensure DDoS doesn’t take place. Hosts must
be securely shielded from substantial and expert attack implants. There are in fact
known signatures and filtering methods to recognize these attacks. Another method
is monitoring network traffic for known attack messages sent amongst attackers and
masters. On the active side, cyber-informants and cyber-spies can be used to intercept
attack plans. For instance, Gibson clearly showed how he effectively spied on attack
plans within a group of agents (Gibson, 2001).
This line of defense alone is clearly deficient. There are always don’t care users and
careless clients who leave their devices vulnerable to DDoS agent implants. Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) and enterprise networks do not have motive to monitor for
attack packets. Besides, spying on attack plans, such as the one presented in (Gibson,
2001) requires an in-depth knowledge of specific methods of launching DDoS attacks,
which may also be changed later on, to avoid spying (Chang, 2002).
Attack source traceback and identification is normally an after-the-fact response
to a DDoS attack. IP traceback refers to the problem, as well as the solution, of the
actual source of any packet sent across the Internet without relying on the source
information from the packet. There are mostly two approaches to deal with the IP
traceback issue. One is for routers to record information about packets for later trace-
back request (Snoeren et al., 2001). Another is for routers to send extra information
about the packets to the packet destinations via either the packets (Savage, Wetherall,
Karlin, & Anderson, 2000) or another channel, such as ICMP messages.
However, it is in-feasible to utilize IP traceback to stop a continuous DDoS attack.
First, current IP traceback solutions are not always able to trace packet origins (e.g.,
those behind firewalls and network address translators). Additionally, IP traceback is
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ineffective towards reflector attacks in which the attack packets originate from legiti-
mate sources. Regardless of the fact that the attack sources can be effectively traced,
preventing them from sending attack packets is another troublesome task, particu-
larly when they are scattered in different autonomous systems (AS). Nevertheless, IP
traceback could be very useful in recognizing the attacker and collecting evidence for
post-attack law enforcement (Chang, 2002).
2.6 Flooding Mitigation
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack utilizing Botnets became widely
used in the Internet because of its efficiency and easy implementation. Zahid, Belmekki,
and Mezrioui (2012) presents a new architecture for detecting DDoS/Brute forcing
attack and destroying the botnet behind. The architecture stops DDoS attacks based
on Botnet command and control and identifies the botmaster machine. The archi-
tecture is composed of DDoS attacks detection agents, spies and central agents that
coordinate with each other during the attack trace-back process. The trace-back
procedure depends on hacking techniques in order to infiltrate the Botnet and get in-
formation about the attacker and the bots utilized. The architecture is intended for
Internet Service Providers (Zahid et al., 2012). Botnets are the predominant mech-
anisms for facilitating the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on computer
networks or applications. To date, Botnet-based DDoS attacks on the application
layer are the latest and most problematic trend in network security threats. Botnet-
based DDoS attacks in the application layer limit resources, shorten revenue, and
yield client dissatisfaction.
DDoS attacks are among the most troublesome problems to resolve online, espe-
cially when the target is a Web Server. Alomari, Manickam, Gupta, Karuppayah,
and Alfaris (2012) introduces a thorough research of Botnet-based DDoS attacks on
application layers, particularly on the web server and decreased incidents of such at-
tacks. Botnet-based DDoS attack incidents and significant revenue losses were also
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described. The study provides a better comprehension of the problem, current solu-
tion space, and future research scope to safeguard against such attacks.
These days, we are witnessing a significant increment in distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks that flood victims from different sources. Intrusion detection
and filtering are required mechanisms to combat against these attacks and properly
secure networks. Nonetheless, the current detection technique for DDoS attacks works
in isolation. Saad, Nait-Abdesselam, and Serhrouchni (2008) proposed a productive
and collaborative architecture that takes into consideration the placement and co-
operation of defense techniques to properly address major security challenges. The
utilization of content-based, distributed hash-table algorithm allows improved scala-
bility and load balancing of an entire system. The architecture has been executed on
ISA entities using table protocol with a promising performance.
Harris, Konikoff, and Petersen (2013) gives a survey of the DDoS landscape and
analyzes the application of the kill-chain concept to the DDoS threat. Utilizing the
concept of detect, deny, disrupt, degrade and destroy. The paper investigates ways
that this chain can be disrupted. An outline of the emerging DDoS threat is provided
and considerations are offered for extra technology and research with the potential to
significantly reduce the current DDoS threat.
Xuan, Chellappan, Wang, and Wang (2004) analyzed the secure overlay services
architecture under intelligent DDoS attacks. They proposed a secure overlay service
architecture to provide reliable communication amongst customers and a target un-
der DDoS attacks. The SOS architecture utilizes an arrangement of overlay nodes
arranged in three hierarchical layers that control access to the target. Even though
the architecture is novel and functions admirably under basic over-flooding based
attacks, it is observed to be vulnerable under more intelligent attacks. The architec-
ture works by introducing more layering flexibility to the original architecture. To
understand the impacts of the amount of layers, neighbors per node and the node
distribution per layer under these two attack models, two intelligent DDoS attack
models are defined and an analytical methodology was developed. The result clearly
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shows that performance is indeed sensitive to the design features that interact with
each other to impact overall system performance.
Keromytis, Misra, and Rubenstein (2004) proposes a design called secure overlay
services (SOS) that proactively prevents denial of service (DoS) attacks, targeted to-
wards supporting emergency services or similar communications. The design utilizes
a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via hashing and filtering. It min-
imize the likelihood of successful attacks by: 1. performing intensive filtering near
the protected network edges and pushing the attack point perimeter into the core
network, where routers can deal with the volume of attack traffic; and 2. introducing
randomness and anonymity into the forwarding architecture, making it difficult for an
attacker to target nodes along the way to a particular SOS-protected network. Uti-
lizing basic analytical models, the research evaluates the possibility that an attacker
can effectively launch a DoS attack against an SOS protected network. The analysis
shows that such an architecture reduces the probability of a successful attack to a
minimal probability. The performance measurements using a prototype implementa-
tion shows an increment in end-to-end latency by a factor of two for the general case,
and an average recovery time of less than 10 seconds.
Beitollahi and Deconinck (2012) analyzed well-known countermeasures against
distributed denial of service attacks. The study provided an in-depth analysis of each
DDoS countermeasure and explained the strengths and challenges of each technique.
The paper designed a countermeasure against the defense mechanism from the attack-
ers perspective. The study is assumed to help potential victims choose appropriate
countermeasures against DDoS attacks based on the methodology presented, as well
as the requirements they need to deploy the techniques.
Tariq, Malik, Abdulrazak, and Hong (2011) researched the packet flood attack
and presented a collaborative peer to peer defense mechanism for DDoS attacks. The
proposed solution identifies the attack at the victim edge router and sends alert mes-
sages to its neighboring nodes which permits them to proactively defend themselves.
Simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of the solution, with less false positives
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at the victim edge router and less damage to the network due to the proactive defense
approach.
Tupakula and Varadharajan (2003) studied counteracting DDoS attacks in multi-
ple ISP domains using routing arbiter architecture. They focus on preventing DDoS
attacks in multiple ISP domains. Other methods used cluster analysis. K. Lee, Kim,
Kwon, Han, and Kim (2008) proposes a strategy for proactive detection of DDoS
attack by exploiting its architecture; the selection of handlers, agents, communica-
tion, compromise, and attack. They proposed DDoS attack detection method using
cluster analysis. The study investigated the strategies of DDoS attack and then chose
variables based on these features. After that, a cluster analysis for proactive detec-
tion of the attack was performed. The researchers experimented with a 2000 DARPA
Intrusion Detection Scenario Specific Data Set in order to assess their methodology.
The outcomes shows that each phase of the attack scenario is well partitioned and
can detect precursors of a DDoS attack as well as the attack itself.
Garg and Chawla (2011) used data mining instead of cluster analysis. Garg and
Chawla (2011) present various significant areas where data mining techniques seem to
be a strong approach for detecting and preventing DDoS. Douligeris and Mitrokotsa
(2004) presents a simple approach to handling DDoS problems by creating a clas-
sification of DDoS attacks and DDoS mechanisms. Each attack and defense system
category are described and the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed scheme
are outlined. The objective of the paper is to introduce some order into the current at-
tack and defense mechanisms, so that a better understanding of DDoS attacks can be
achieved; also advanced and more effective algorithms and procedures to combat these
attacks may be created. Koutepas, Stamatelopoulos, and Maglaris (2004) introduces
Distributed management architecture for cooperative detection and reaction to DDoS
attacks. Koutepas et al. (2004) proposes a cooperative intrusion detection framework
focused on mitigating DDoS attack by introducing distributed overlay early-warning
network. The objective is to minimize detection and reaction times and automate
response, involving as many networks as possible along the attack path, which can
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then be detected locally without trace-back procedures. The fundamental building
block is the cooperative anti-DDoS entity and a modular software system deployed
in each participating network domain that supports secure message exchanges and
local responses tailored to individual site policies. The study explains the operation
and deployment of prototype, provides a survey of the approaches against DDoS and
compares the approaches to related work.
Pushback is a tool for mitigating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
DDoS attacks are treated as a congested-control problem, but because most conges-
tions are caused by malicious hosts not obeying traditional end-to-end congestion
control, the issue must be taken care of by routers. Functionality is added to each
router to detect and preferentially drop packets that most likely are attributed with
an attack. Upstream routers are likewise configured to drop such packets (henceforth
the term pushback) in order to transfer legitimate traffic. J. Ioannidis and Bellovin
(2002) presents an architecture for pushback, its execution under FreeBSD, and sug-
gestions for how such a system can be implemented in routers (J. Ioannidis & Bellovin,
2002). Ando, Miwa, Kadobayashi, and Shinoda (2008) presents a load balancing sys-
tem for mitigating DDoS attacks using live migration of virtual machines. Ando et
al. (2008) applies virtual machine monitor to modify the virtualized operating sys-
tem, and afterward outlines the detailed countermeasure for DoS attacks utilizing live
migration.
Honeypot is a trap used to communicate with potential attackers to divert, detect,
or prevent such attacks and guarantee uninterrupted availability of service. Desh-
pande (2015) prevented distributed denial of service attacks using virtualized honey-
pots. Deshpande (2015) gives insight into the issues introduced by distributed denial
of service attacks, current solutions that use honeypots, and how a mesh of virtualized
honeypots can be used to mitigate distributed denial of service attacks. Srivatsa, Iyen-
gar, Yin, and Liu (2008) mitigated application-level denial of service attacks in web
server using a client-transparent approach. Srivatsa et al. (2008) proposes handling
DoS attacks by using a twofold approach. First, the researcher performs admission
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control to limit the amount of concurrent clients served by the online service, invisi-
ble to unauthorized clients by hiding the port number on which the service accepts
incoming request. Second, admission control carries out a congestion control which
allows admitted clients to allocate more resources to other approved clients. Conges-
tion control is achieved by setting a client’s priority level in response to the client’s
requests in a way that incorporates application-level semantics. The article displays
a detailed assessment of the proposed arrangement utilizing two sample applications,
Apache HTTPD and the TPCW benchmark (running on Apache Tomcat and IBM
DB2). The study demonstrates that the proposed solution results in low performance
overhead and is resilient to DoS attacks.
The need to keep an attacker unmindful of attack mitigation efforts is a very
important component of protection against denial of services (DoS) and distributed
denial of services (DDoS) attacks, because it helps to dissuade attackers from changing
their attack patterns. DDoS protection can be achieved in two parts. The first is a
fake server that provides a service function or receives attack traffic as a substitute
for a legitimate server. The second is a decoy network that restricts attack traffic to
the peripherals of a network, or reroutes attack activity to fake servers.
Okada, Hazeyama, and Kadobayashi (2014) proposes the use of a two-stage map
table expansion Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) to understand the fake net-
work. It explains and showed how LISP can be used to deploy an oblivious DDoS
mitigation mechanism by adding an extension to the LISP Map Server. Together
with fake servers, this approach can end DDoS activity on the ingress end of a LISP-
enabled network. At last, the paper verified the effectiveness of the proposed mecha-
nism through simulated DDoS attacks on a simple network topology. The test results
demonstrate that the mechanism could be deployed within a few seconds, and the
attack traffic can be terminated without incurring overhead on the MapServer.
Shameli-Sendi, Pourzandi, Fekih-Ahmed, and Cheriet (2015) uses taxonomy of
distributed denial of service mitigation approaches for cloud computing to concentrate
on how to mitigate DDoS attacks. It presents a new taxonomy of DDoS mitigation,
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then discusses the principle elements of existing DDoS mitigation approaches and
clarifies their functionalities in the cloud environment. Afterwards, it indicates how
the current DDoS systems fit into the network topology of the cloud. Finally, the
survey paper presented some of these DDoS mechanisms in detail, and compares their
behavior in the cloud. The goal is to show how these characteristics bring an original
perspective into existing DDoS mechanisms, and give researchers new experiences
into how to mitigate DDoS attacks in cloud computing. Bhardwaj, Subrahmanyam,
Avasthi, and Sastry (2015) proposes three tier network architecture to mitigate DDoS
attacks on hybrid cloud environments. They use a multi-tiered network design based
on hybrid cloud solution that has premise solution acceptable to the organization’s
IT security and operations team, as well as public cloud infrastructure capable of
handling large sized DDoS attacks targeted towards hybrid cloud servers.
Miao, Yu, and Jain (2014) highlights a few novel elements and advancement pat-
tern among DDoS attacks: 1) Large-scale. These attacks have the volume of up to
hundred gigabits per second against a single cloud service. 2) Diverse attacks. The
attacks range from network-layer (e.g. SYN surge, UDP surge) to application-layer
(e.g. HTTP GET, SQL infusion) with varied characteristics for volume, number of
connections, and packet header signature (e.g., TCP flag, port). 3) Fast ramp-up
rate. The attack traffic ramps up quickly and influences the target cloud service
usually within a minute. In response to these challenges, the attack detection and
mitigation system needs to: 1) have adequate capacity to handle attack volume: 2)
support the detection of diverse range of attacks: and 3) have accurate and quick
attack detection with low damage to legitimate traffic.
To identify attacks, cloud operators usually use commercial hardware devices,
such as Firewalls, IDS and DDoS-protection tools in the network. There are three
issues with these hardware boxes. First, these hardware devices cannot address over-
whelming attacks in cloud scale. For instance, Firewall and IDS look at the states
and detailed signature of packets. They cannot handle attacks with high volume.
DDoS-protection appliances verify only significant traffic at the network-layer; they
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can address larger attack volumes, but are not capable of handling virtual scale at-
tacks of hundred of gigabits per second traffic. Second, these hardware boxes present
unfavorable cost and capacity trade-offs. For example, the DDoS-protection appliance
typically costs up to a million dollars per box annually. Third, since these devices
run vendor specific software, they limit how operators can configure them to handle
the increasing diversity of attacks.
There are commercial attack mitigation services (CloudFlare, Prolexic etc.,) that
redirect web service and enterprise traffic through a dedicate high-capacity network
for attacks detection and mitigation. However, most clients do not want their traffic
to be re-routed considering the private concerns (Miao et al., 2014).
To address this issue, one paper proposes another paradigm for attack-prevention-
as-a-service that uses commodity VMs for attack detection and mitigation. It in-
troduces the NIMBUS service, which combines the elasticity of cloud computing
resources with the algorithm found in software-defined networks (SDN). NIMBUS
scales resource usage with traffic requests, to handle diverse attack efficiently and
without the exposure of private clients traffic (Miao et al., 2014).
2.7 Chapter Summary
Indispensable research and studies have been conducted regarding the Information
Security field as a whole. Everyday new threats and defense mechanisms evolve, and
research is being conducted to understand the problems and provide solutions. In
this chapter, we reviewed several studies relating to this dissertation. The purpose
of this related literature is to understand the current state of the problem we are
trying to solve. To the best of our knowledge, research has yet to address the issue
of network downtime as a result of firewall failures. However, a number of studies
that addresses DoS attacks, network security and firewall configurations have been
conducted. Based on these studies, we decided to implement the proposed study.
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We also explained how commercial DDoS mitigation solutions are sophisticated
techniques; but, depending on the attack and the target, they may not always be
sufficient. One major draw-back of commercial-based solutions is the fact that they
are also susceptible to attack. Attackers are finding ways to infiltrate DDoS mitigation
companies. Once an attacker bypasses these commercial companies, it becomes much
easier to gain access to a network. Also there is an issue of having third parties monitor
network traffic; therefore, we conclude that the best DDoS mitigation technique is
for an innovative solution.
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3. TRADITIONAL ARCHITECTURE PERFORMANCE
TEST
3.1 Introduction
The Internet is an exciting and informative place to browse and explore. It is
the great frontier and grandiose achievement of mankind. In reality, the World Wide
Web is merely a collection of routers and servers that make up the largest wide-area
network (WAN) in recorded history. The collection of networking gears provides mail
servers, websites, and other information storage and retrieval systems which are all
connected to the Internet and accessible to every person connected. It has even been
said that the Internet contains the collective institutional knowledge of mankind.
The rapid expansion of the internet has provided tremendous opportunities to
access an unparalleled amount of data. An organization connects to the internet to
gain access to information and to share information with the public; once a company
connects its private network to the internet, that organizations private information
becomes vulnerable to hackers. When private networks are connected to the internet,
the risk are great. However, using some security measures, one can share public
information and still protect private information. One of these measures is to install
a firewall between the private network and the internet (Blacharski, 1998).
A firewall is a security device that sits on the edge of your Internet connection
and functions as an Internet Border Security Officer. It constantly monitors all in-
coming and outgoing connection traffic (Ierace, Urrutia, & Bassett, 2005; Thomas &
Stoddard, 2011).
The use of firewalls is no longer confined to servers, websites, or commercial com-
panies. Even if you simply dial your ISP or use PPP (Point-to-Point protocol) to surf
the internet, you simply cannot do so without a firewall.
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In other words, a firewall acts as a shield to protect your system from untrusted,
non-reliable systems connected to the Internet. Conceptually, it drives from the
firewalls-barriers made of fire-resistant material-used in vehicles. A firewall on your
PC, however, listens to all ports on your system for any attempts defined by set
of rules. To phrase it more technically; a firewall is a piece of software, hardware,
or both that allows only selected packets to pass from the internet to your private
network or system. There are different types of firewalls and firewall generations. For
the purpose of this dissertation, we focus on Hardware and Virtual based firewalls
that belong to the Third Generation of firewalls.
Firewall Appliances (Hardware-Based)
These are firewalls that come hardened in a box. These types of firewalls provide
services from a host attached to the internal network using a separate router. In this
architecture, packet filtering provides the primary security, preventing people from
going around proxy servers to make direct connections.
Host Firewalls (Virtual-Based)
These are firewalls that are installed on hosts themselves. These firewalls are
installed just like an OS. They are mostly installed on servers. They are normally
used in conjunction with other firewalls.
Third Generation Firewalls - SMLI
Stateful Multi-Layer Inspection (SMLI) represents a third generation of firewall
technology. This new class of firewall can be applied internally and externally, over
different protocol boundaries, and with numerous advanced functions. SMLI is similar
to the application gateway model; it examines all seven layers of the OSI model.
Instead of relying on a proxy, SMLI relies on a traffic screening algorithm optimized
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for high throughput. Each packet is examined and compared against known states
of friendly packets. SMLI examines the entire packet (both address and application
data). Because SMLI does not use a proxy, it overcomes the performance problems
of the application gateway model.
The SMLI solution enables all applications to run natively over the firewall, be-
cause no proxies or modifications are necessary. The user also does not face additional
passwords or validation procedures, so the solution is transparent to the end user
(Blacharski, 1998).
Access Controls
All information that flows across the Internet uses TCP/IP. In turn, this infor-
mation is sent in small pieces known as packets. In the early days of the internet,
filtering based on packets was common; in many cases, routers in many networks still
use packet filtering. The methods used to configure and deploy packet filters on Cisco
ASA and routers is known as an access control list (ACL). There are two main types
of ACLs: the standard ACL, which filters based on IP address, and extended ACLs,
which look further into packet headers (Thomas & Stoddard, 2011). An access list
is essentially a list of conditions that categorize packets. They can be really helpful
when you need to exercise control over network traffic. An access list is the tool of
choice for decision making in packet filtering (Waziri Jr, 2014).
One of the most common and easy to understand uses of the access list is filtering
unwanted packets when implementing security policies. Access to the internet brings
corporations the advantage of widespread access to share information. However, it
also brings the risk of attack and unauthorized access. Access control is a critical
part of security policy that must be implemented in the firewall (Panko, 2010).
Access control policy specifies what and who can enter or exit the corporate net-
work. To maintain access control, the security administrator must have a clear picture
of all services and applications available. Earlier packet filtering routers could not
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do this task because they were unaware of applications. Second generation firewalls,
or application proxies, are application-aware, but consume a great deal of overhead.
Later technologies use stateful inspection and other advanced techniques build on this
application-layer awareness, while providing faster support for new services. Access
control should not only address what can pass into the network, but should also allow
the security admin to be able to the specify rules for what time each user can access
which service. The two main types of access lists are as follows:
Standard Access Lists
This uses just the source IP address in an IP packet as the condition test. All
choices depend on the source IP address. This implies standard access lists essentially
allow or deny a whole suite of protocols. They don’t recognize the numerous types of
IP packets, for example, Web, Telnet, UDP, etc.
Extended Access Lists
Extended access lists can assess other fields in the layer 3 and 4 headers of an
IP packet. They can evaluate source and destination IP addresses, the protocol field
in the Network layer header, and the port number at the Transport layer header.
This gives extended access lists the capacity to make more in-depth inspection and
granular decisions when controlling traffic. More in-depth description about standard
and extended access lists is available in Cisco books.
3.2 Problem Statement
Information security professionals find themselves working against misconceptions
and popular opinions formed from incomplete data, for example, the possibility that
internal network security can be secured simply by deploying a firewall. A firewall
is a perimeter defense and it is not designed to combat the threat within. First and
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Second Generation firewalls do not secure against malicious code issues like viruses
and Trojan horses (Garfinkel, Spafford, & Schwartz, 2003; NSTISSC, 2000; Smith,
2015), although some are capable of scanning for telltale signs. Configuring packet-
filtering rules has a tendency to be a complicated process, in the course of which errors
can easily occur leading to holes in the defense. In addition, testing the configured
rules has a tendency to be lengthy and a difficult process due to the shortcomings of
current testing tools. Ordinary packet-filtering routers cannot enforce some security
policies simply because the necessary information is unavailable.
Configuring a firewall can be troublesome when the goal is to guarantee maximum
security and functionality. Fortunately, most decent firewalls now come with a rea-
sonable defaults access list. Some say you only need a hardware firewall. The issue is
that no firewall can prevent legitimate traffic from any source (wanted or unwanted).
This is potentially particularly problematic if you have file or print sharing enabled,
considering attackers out there are testing all the time for this exploitable back door
into a computer system.
Because of the known issues with firewalls, which is not having the ability to
configure access control that would mitigate DDoS at the same time allow legitimate
traffic to pass through. Firewalls are prone to DDoS attacks. From our literature
review, we know that firewall performance depends on its available resources. DDoS
attack exhaust available resources from its target. We decided to find a way to miti-
gate DDoS attacks that target firewalls. First, we started by testing the performance
of a hardware firewall to see how much it can endure.
A paper on this work has been published in the proceedings of IEEE SouthEastCon
2015 (Waziri Jr & Shropshire, 2015).
3.3 Traditional Architecture Overview
The traditional test architecture utilizes one firewall, as shown in Figure 3.1. The
aim of this test was to find the endurance and spike results of a hardware firewall. A
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specialized load testing tool (JMeter) was configured in a master/slave configuration.
The load testing tool was used to implement a HTTP flooding attack. The attack
was implemented by generating heavy HTTP traffic which targets a web server. The
hardware firewall sits inline between the attacker system and the web server, making
all traffic pass through the firewall. Using the ACL1 shown in Table 3.1, HTTP traffic
is allowed access, and hence the firewall doesn’t block any HTTP traffic. This is done
to allow access to the web-server, considering that DDoS attacks are implemented
using legitimate traffic.
Fig. 3.1. Traditional Environment Architecture
3.4 Implementation & Configuration Setting
To set up the test-bed used in the traditional architecture, we used the following
technologies and configurations:
Internet Protocol Version
We used the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to set up the IP addresses of
all devices in the environment. The reason behind the choice of IPv4 and not the
1See Appendix A1
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newer IPv6 is because IPv4 is the most widely used Internet Protocol (Gupta, 2010).
That makes IPv4 more relevant to our study than IPv6. Also previous studies have
shown that TCP-Flood, UDP-Flood, and ICMP-Flood types of DDoS attacks are the
only types of attacks that change behavior between IPv4 and IPv6 and not HTTP-
Flood (X. Yang, Ma, & Shi, 2007). The major difference between IPv6 and IPv4 are
Optimized DHCP, IPSec, Larger address space, and Optimized mobility feature (Bade
& Vanduhe, n.d.; Baker, Iturralde, Le Faucheur, & Davie, 2001; Nikander, Gurtov, &
Henderson, 2010). We configured the architecture using a static IP address because
it eliminates the plug and play networking provided by DHCP, thereby ensuring more
security (Sitaraman, Mann, Dos Santos, Lou, & Bhasham, 2002). For a complete list
of all the IP addresses used refer to Appendix A.
Application Protocol
We used Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to flood the devices; it is the only
legitimate protocol allowed in our Access Control configuration. We used HTTP
because it is the protocol used to communicate between a client and a web-server
(Casilari, Gonzblez, & Sandoval, 2001). A client submits a HTTP request message
to the server, and the server respond with resources such as HTML files and other
contents (Mah, 1997). Because we are using HTTP, we decided to implement a
HTTP-Flood DDoS attack.
Packet Filters Access Control
For the hardware firewall in the traditional architecture, we blocked incoming
traffic on eth0, the outside Ethernet port. We allowed only ICMP, HTTP, and TCP
Port 80, because ICMP is used to Ping the network (Deering, 1991). HTTP is used
to communicate with the web server (Mah, 1997) and TCP port 80 is the endpoint
used to communicate HTTP used in WWW (Cole, 2011). Table 3.1 shows the access
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Table 3.1
Access Control List of Traditional Packet Filter
Command List
Allow Config# access-list 110 permit TCP any eq 80 host 10.10.10.0/24
Allow Config# access-list 110 permit ICMP any any
Allow Config# access-list 110 permit HTTP any any
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 520
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny ip any host X.X.X.X
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny ospf any any
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny host X.X.X.X
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 21
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 22
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 25
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 110
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 143
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 135
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 445
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 1434
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4444
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4899
Deny Config# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 135
Config access-group 110 in interface ’outside’
Apply ’outside’ inbound traffic on eth0/0
control list applied to the inbound Ethernet port of the firewall. A complete list of






CPU Intel Quad Core 4.66GHz
Storage 2TB
Deployed Hypervisor
A web server is the final destination of our HTTP-Flood attack. The web server
runs as a virtual machine in a virtualized environment. And for every virtualized
environment to run virtual machines, there must be a hypervisor that is being used
to create and runs the virtual machine (ESXi, n.d.). In this dissertation we used a
VMWare ESXi hypervisor. The hypervisor run on a dedicated hardware server with
the configuration shown in Table 3.2.
Load Tester - JMeter
A load tester (JMeter) was used to generate the HTTP-Flood attack. We used a
fully-featured web application test suite that can simulate a variety of real-life user
behavior. Using the load tester, we were able to generate approx 3,250 request per
second of HTTP traffic. The configuration used in the load tester can be found in
Table 3.3 and 3.4. A full installation guide can be found in (JMeter, n.d.).
The configuration was composed of a sequence of set-up components (No. of
Threads, Ramp-Up, and Loop Count) that determines how the load test will be
simulated. Table 3.4 shows the configuration components and parameters used to




No. of Threads(users) No. of users JMeter will attempt to simulate.
Ramp-Up (in secs) Duration of time JMeter will take to distribute the start of thread
Loop Count No. of times to execute the test.
HTTP Request Defaults
We added a HTTP Request Defaults. The HTTP Request Defaults configuration
element is used to set default values for HTTP Request in our test plan. This is
useful because we want to send multiple HTTP requests to the server as part of our
test. In the HTTP Request Defaults, under the Web Server section. We added the




No. of Threads (users) 32500.




We used an Apache HTTP Server, because it is the most popular web server
(Project, n.d.). We installed and configured the web server inside a Ubuntu Linux
distribution. We configured the Apache web server by placing directives in plain text
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configuration files. These directives are separated between the following files and
directories. The directives are:
1. apache2.conf : the main Apache2 configuration file. Contains settings that are
global to Apache2.
2. httpd.conf : historically the main Apache2 configuration file, named after the
HTTPd daemon. The file no longer exists. In older versions of Ubuntu the file
might be present but empty, as all configuration options have been moved to
the directories mentioned below.
3. conf-available: this directory contains available configuration files. All files
that were previously in /etc/apache2/conf.d should be moved to /etc/apache2/conf-
available.
4. conf-enabled: holds symlinks to the files in /etc/apache2/conf-available. When
a configuration file is symlinked, it will be enabled the next time apache2 is
restarted.
5. envvars: file where Apache2 environment variables are set.
6. mods-available: this directory contains configuration files to load modules
and configure them. Not all modules have specific configuration files, however.
7. mods-enabled: holds symlinks to the files in /etc/apache2/mods-available.
When a module configuration file is symlinked, it will be enabled the next time
apache2 is restarted.
8. ports.conf : houses the directives that determine which TCP ports Apache2 is
listening.
9. sites-available: this directory has configuration files for Apache2 Virtual Hosts.
Virtual Hosts allow Apache2 to be configured for multiple sites that have sep-
arate configurations.
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10. sites-enabled: similar to mods-enabled, sites-enabled contains symlinks to the
/etc/apache2/sites-available directory. Similarly when a configuration file in
sites-available is symlinked, the site configured will be active once Apache2 is
restarted.
11. magic: instructions for determining MIME type based on the first few bytes of
a file.
We installed the Apache web server inside a Ubuntu Linux distribution using this
command:
sudo apt-get install apache2
And we configured the web server using these commands:
sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 start #start webserver
sudo /update-rc.d apache defaults #runs webserver from autostart
gksu gedit /etc/apache2/sites-available/site1 #this enable the .htaccess file
sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 restart #this restarts apache
3.5 Implementing the Traditional Test
In order to implement the test, the hardware firewall was configured to allow
HTTP traffic, and the load testing tool (Jmeter) - an open source application, which
is a 100% pure Java application designed to load test functional behavior - measures
performance and test web applications2 used to generate HTTP traffic. The traffic
was targeted towards the firewall, and configured in a master/slave configuration.
Three computers were serving as Masters and 59 as slave. The “Number of Threads”
(threads are used to simulate concurrent connections to your server application) is set
to 32500. Each thread will execute the test plan in its entirety, completely indepen-
dently of other test threads. The “Ramp-Up Period” (ramp-up period tells JMeter
2http://jmeter.apache.org/
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how long to take to “ramp-up” to the full number of threads chosen. If 10 threads are
used, and the ramp-up period is 100 seconds; JMeter will take 100 seconds to get all
10 threads up and running). Figure 3.2 depicts the load tester configuration settings.
Fig. 3.2. JMeter configuration Settings
For the attack to be implemented, the load tester (JMeter) connects to our Apache
web server, and establishes a TCP connection using a three-way handshake:
JMeter sends a SYN packet to Apache web server.
Apache web server sends a SYN ACK packet to JMeter.
JMeter sends an ACK packet to Apache web server.
HTTP Flood involves opening up a valid TCP connection with ApacheWeb server,
and then sending a request.
Immediately after the TCP connection is opened between JMeter and Apache web
server, allowing free communication between the two, JMeter starts sending HTTP
GET requests to the Apache web server using the default parser.
org.apache.jmeter.protocol.http.parser.LargeBasedHtmlParser.











































































































































































































































































































































































The HTTP GET Flood legitimately downloads a picture (pic1.jpg) from the
Apache Web server’s index page. It establishes a full session and actually receives all
the data from the web page. Because our traditional firewall sits inline between the
load tester (client) and the web server, the firewall has to process every GET request
that passes through. Approximately 3,250 request were sent per second, ultimately
over flooding the firewall because it couldn’t process every request sent. Figure 3.3
shows JMeter sending the HTTP request packets.
Fig. 3.3. HTTP GET Flood Request
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3.6 Evaluation & Analysis
As shown in Figure 3.4, the traditional test which uses real HTTP traffic generated
from the load tester configured in Master/Slave on 62 computers. The packet drop
was at 76.5%, the CPU Utilization was at 67%, and the memory utilization at 81%.
This is the level at which the hardware firewall became non-responsive, the hardware
firewall was maxed out, which results in its failure with a downtime of about 30
seconds, and about 56 seconds recovery time, as shown in Table 3.5. As the attack
load increases, the CPU usage of the hardware firewall increases. Table 3.8 shows the
CPU utilization based on the time required. In addition to the CPU utilization, the
memory utilization also reaches a maximum of 81%. The packet drop was high based
on the received and transmitted packets, as shown in Table 3.6.
Fig. 3.4. The Traditional Architecture Results
3.6.1 Downtime & Recovery Period Analysis
Table 3.5 shows the downtime and recovery time of the hardware packet filter
following its failure. The hardware firewall was non-responsive for about 30 seconds
before it became responsive. It took about 56 seconds to recover to its working state.
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The recovery period followed the test (HTTP flood attack) suspension. Part of the
longer duration in the recovery period was as a result of the boot sequence.
Fig. 3.5. Recovery & Downtime Periods


















CPU Utilization & Time Required Analysis





Due to the fact that the hardware firewall fails under heavy traffic as presented, we
decided to define new set of thresholds, different than those set by the firewall vendor.
When these thresholds are reached, the device is rendered incapable of performing as
required; hence, an action must be taken to avoid failure. The newly defined threshold
based on the results collected are presented in Table 3.9.
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Table 3.9
Traditional Packet Filter: Newly Defined Threshold
Packet Drop ≥ 10%
Memory Utilization ≥ 80%
CPU Utilization ≥ 65%
3.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter highlights our test-bed implementation, and hardware firewall out-
comes. From the result, we defined new thresholds to be used in subsequent chapter.
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4. VIRTUALIZED ARCHITECTURE PERFORMANCE
TEST
4.1 Introduction
Cloud computing represents one of the most significant shifts in information tech-
nology we are likely to see in our lifetimes. Customers are both excited and nervous
about the prospects of Cloud Computing. They are excited by the opportunities to
reduce capital costs, divest infrastructure management, and focus on core competen-
cies. Most of all, they are excited by the agility offered by the on-demand provisioning
of computing and the ability to align information technology with business strategies
and needs more readily. However, customers are also very concerned about the risks
of Cloud Computing if it is not properly secured. And the loss of direct control over
systems for which they are nonetheless accountable.
Security controls in cloud computing are, for the most part, no different than se-
curity controls in any IT environment. However, because of the cloud service models,
operational models, and the technologies used to enable cloud services, cloud com-
puting may present different risks than traditional IT solutions to an organization.
Some of the security threats to cloud computing outlined by Cloud Security Al-
liance (CSA) are: Abuse and nefarious use of Cloud computing, Insecure API’s,
Malicious Insider, Shared Technology Vulnerabilities, Data Loss/Leakage, Account,
Service & Traffic Hijacking, Unknown risk profile & Hypercall Threats (Alliance,
2011). NIST defined Cloud Computing as:
“A model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell & Grance, 2011).
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In a nutshell, cloud computing is a way of separating an application from the
operating system and hardware. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) defined cloud
computing as:
“an evolving term that describes the development of many existing technologies and
approaches to computing into something different. Cloud separates application and
information resources from the underlying infrastructure, and mechanisms used to
deliver them” (Alliance, 2011).
4.1.1 Virtualized Environments
Cloud Computing services are usually backed by large-scale data centers composed
of thousands of computers. Such data centers are built to serve many users and
host many disparate applications. For this purpose, hardware virtualization can be
considered as a perfect fit to overcome most operational issues of data center building
maintenance (Buyya et al., 2010). Virtualization allows running multiple operating
systems and software stacks on a single physical platform. Figure 4.1 shows a software
layer, the hypervisor also known as a virtual machine monitor (VMM), which mediates
access to the physical hardware, presenting each guest operating system (VM) a set
of virtual platform interfaces.
Virtualization has been a key enabling technology for the evolution of cloud com-
puting in its current form (Irvine, Robin, et al., 2000; Popek & Goldberg, 1974). In
particular, a hardware virtualization has enabled IaaS providers to efficiently use the
available hardware resources in order to provide computing and storage services to
their clients.
Type I VMM
Type I VMM, also known as a bare-metal, runs on a bare machine. It is an
operating system with virtualization mechanisms. A type I VMM runs directly on
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Fig. 4.1. Traditional vs. Virtualized Environments.
the machine hardware. It is an operating system or kernel that has mechanisms
to support virtual machines. It performs scheduling and resources allocation for all
virtual machines in the system and requires drivers for hardware peripherals.
4.1.2 Network Functions Virtualization
Network function virtualization is an initiative to virtualize network services be-
ing carried out by proprietary, dedicated hardware. NFV decreases the proprietary
hardware needed to launch and operate network services 1. NFV allows network oper-
ators to instantiate middleboxes in virtual machines and place those VMs at arbitrary
locations in the network (ESTI, n.d.). Current approaches to NFV still treat middle-
boxes as monolithic entities, and do not explore how the constituent components of
a middlebox might be decomposed into smaller modules (Anwer et al., 2015).
Because of the various partners with clashing objectives and strategies, changes to
the current network designs are presently constrained to basic incremental additions;
deployment of any new radically different technology is next to impossible. To bat-
tle off this solidification, network virtualization has been portrayed as a diversifying
1TechTarget - NFV defined
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attribute to the future inner-networking paradigm. By introducing a plurality of het-
erogenous network architectures cohabiting on a shared physical substrate, network
virtualization promotes innovations and diversified applications. A paper surveyed
the existing technologies and wide-array of past and state-of-the-art projects on net-
work virtualization followed by a discussion of major changes in the area (Chowdhury
& Boutaba, 2010).
Network function virtualization (NFV) has drawn significant attention from both
industry and academia as an important shift in telecommunication service provision-
ing. By decoupling network functions (NFs) from the physical devices on which they
run, NFV has the potential to lead to significant reductions in operating expenses
(OPEX) and capital expenses (CAPEX) that facilitate the deployment of new ser-
vices with increased agility and faster time-to-value. The NFV paradigm is still in
its infancy and there is a large spectrum of opportunities for the research community
to develop new architectures, systems, and applications, to evaluate alternatives and
trade-offs in developing technologies for its successful deployment. After discussing
NFV and its relationship with complementary fields of software-defined networking
(SDN) and cloud computing. A study surveyed the state-of-the-art NFV, and iden-
tify promising research directions in the area. The study also presents an overview
of key NFV projects, standardization efforts, early implementations, use cases, and
commercial products (Mijumbi et al., 2015).
Middlebox hardware appliances are known to come with a number of problems,
such as being costly, difficult to manage, and inflexible in their functionality. NFV
has alleviated all such problems and due to NFV’s flexibility, several platforms are
in place. A group of researchers introduced ClickOS a high performance, virtual-
ized software middlebox platform. ClickOS virtual machines are small (5MB), boot
quickly (20 milliseconds), add little delay (45 microseconds), and over one hundred
hosts can concurrently run while saturating a 10Gb pipe on a commodity server. The
study implements a wide range of middleboxes, including a firewall, a carrier-grade
NAT, and a load balancer to show that ClickOS can handle packets in the millions per
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second (Martins et al., 2014). Others presented EmPOWER, an experiment test-bed
which aims at offering an open platform on top of which novel concepts can be tested
at scale (Riggio, Rasheed, & Granelli, 2013).
Another article presents the analysis, design, and first implementation of the rout-
ing function in a virtualized manner. Considering the current co-existence of IPv4 and
IPv6 and the possibilities brought into the arena by OpenFlow-enabled infrastruc-
tures, the article describes the design of the virtualized routing protocol, its enabled
simple management and signaling messages overhead avoidance in the control plane
level, and the different scenarios considered to validate the virtualized function. In
essence, the study describes the first implementation of the functional NFV concept
through the virtualization of the routing function over an OpenFlow network. The
different scenarios validated in the article are used to demonstrate the applicability
of the NFV-powered implementation proposed into actual production environments
(Batalle, Ferrer Riera, Escalona, & Garcia-Espin, 2013). Another study presents
a measurement to characterize the impact of virtualization on the networking per-
formance of the Amazon Elastic Cloud Computing (EC2) data center. The study
measures the processor sharing, packet delay, TCP/UDP throughput, and packet
loss among Amazon EC2 virtual machines. The results show that although the data
center network is lightly utilized, virtualization can still cause significant throughput
instability and abnormal delay variations. The study concludes with the implications
of its findings on several classes of applications (G. Wang & Ng, 2010).
4.2 Problem Statement
The study proves that virtualization can result in overhead due to decreased per-
formance (Sahoo, Mohapatra, & Lath, 2010). This happens because performance is
often being compromised due to flexibility. Virtual machines have the capability of
sharing resources through resource management (Beloglazov & Buyya, 2010). This
works when one virtual machine borrows resources from another idle virtual machine.
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This resource sharing capability of virtual machines comes with security issues when
a running virtual machine borrows all of the available resources, making idle virtual
machines completely disengage without the capability of running. Other associated
problems identified with resource sharing are hypercall and hyperthreats. The run-
ning virtual machine keeps on requesting resources until there is none available. Hence
all other functions are rendered ineffective (Shropshire, 2015). However, with these
known issues, multiple studies prove that when network functions are virtualized,
they perform better than traditional hardware devices (Guillen et al., 2012; Qiu et
al., 2001; Sheth & Thakker, 2011; Waziri Jr et al., 2014; Waziri Jr & Shropshire,
2015).
Single point of failure (SPOF) is always an issue. Even though virtual machines
are decoupled from the hardware, VM’s are still dependent on the hardware running
the hypervisor (server). Failure in the hardware automatically results in a failure of
all virtual machines (Menasce´, 2005; Pfaff et al., 2009; Sahoo et al., 2010).
In this dissertation, we tested both hardware and virtual firewalls; we also found
that virtual packet filters to be more reliable under stress. However, because a hard-
ware firewall is used to protect the underlying hardware (server) used by the hyper-
visor, whatever affects the traditional firewall affects the virtualized environment. To
find the threshold of the virtual firewall, we implemented the same test carried out
on the traditional firewall, using a different load testing tool.
4.3 Virtual Architecture Overview
Similar to the traditional architecture, the aim of the virtual test was to find the
weakness and limitations of the virtual firewall. The virtual firewall was installed
as a VM in a virtualized environment and connected inline prior to the web server.
However, in the case of the virtual test, a different load testing tool2 was used to
generate the HTTP flood packets. The reason for using a different testing tool was
2High Orbit Ion Cannon
69
the limitation of resources imposed by the virtual environment. Figure 4.2 depicts
the virtual architecture. The ACL3 used in the virtual firewall is similar to that of
the hardware firewall allowing HTTP traffic, ICMP, and TCP Port 80, while blocking
all other incoming connections.
Fig. 4.2. Virtual Environment Architecture
4.4 Implementation & Configuration Settings
Load Tester - HOIC
We used HOIC as the HTTP Flood load tester. HOIC is an open source network
stress testing and denial of service attack application written in BASIC. It is designed
to attack as many as 256 URLs simultaneously Unlike the normal master/zombie
architecture of DDoS attacks, HOIC works based on bandwidth availability. Using
HOIC, we were able to generate HTTP traffic of approximately 1Gbps per thread.
These were generated from 249 Cannons and 2 Threads. Table 4.1 shows our HOIC









Cannons per Thread 249
Output per Thread >1GB
1. URL - The address of the Apache Web server
2. Power - This sets the velocity. We set the power to ’HIGH’, making it 8
request/sec for each thread.
3. Booster - The script used to generate the HTTP Flood. We used the ’Gener-
icBoost.hoic’ script.
4. Threads - The number of users HOIC will attempt to simulate.
Building a Test Plan - HOIC
The test plan is composed of a sequence of the components presented above. The
components determines how the traffic will be generated. We configured these details.
Table 4.1 presents the configuration values for the virtual firewall load testing.
Similar to the Traditional Test, the HTTP GET Flood we initiated is legitimately
downloading a picture (pic1.jpg) from the Apache Web server, meaning it establishes
a full TCP session and actually receives all the data from the web page because
the virtual firewall sits inline between the load tester (client) and the web server.
The firewall must process every GET request that passes through. More than 1GB
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of traffic were generated per threat per session. We finally over-flooded the virtual
firewall because it couldn’t process each an every request that was sent.
From the settings configured, the HTTP packets that targeted the Apache web
server were captured as:
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 200 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 201 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 202 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 203 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 204 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 205 21124
4.4.1 HTTP GET Flood Request
HOIC request are not static; they randomly request from different sources, based





User-Agent: HOIC/4.0 (CLR 1.1.4322)
If-Modified-Since: Fri, 10 Jun 2016 11:59:59 GMT
Host: 10.10.10.79
The request specifies “HTTP/2,” which is the successor of HTTP/1.1 that was
standardized in 2015. HTTP/2 enables a more efficient use of network resources and
a reduced perception of latency by introducing header field compression and allowing
multiple concurrent exchanges on the same connection (Belshe, Thomson, & Peon,
2015). The host header can be analyzed using packet analysis tools, such as wireshark,
which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, we can see the host address
as “10.10.10.79.”
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Virtual Packet Filter Access Control
Similar to the traditional firewall, we blocked all incoming traffic on eth0 (the
outside ethernet port) of the virtual firewall. We allowed ICMP, HTTP, and the
TCP Port 80. This allows for end to end communication and pinging between the
client and web-server, Below are the Access Control List applied to eth0:
• Rule 1:
Vyatta# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 action reject
Vyatta# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 source address X.X.X.X
Vyatta# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 protocol TCP
• Rule 2:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 source address X.X.X.X
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 protocol TCP
• Rule 3:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 protocol UDP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 destination port 520
• Rule 4:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 source address X.X.X.X
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 protocol IP
• Rule 5:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 protocol OSPF
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• Rule 6:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 source address X.X.X.X
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 protocol TCP
• Rule 7:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 destination port 80
• Rule 8:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 destination port 21
• Rule 9:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 destination port 22
• Rule 10:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 destination port 25
• Rule 11:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 destination port 110
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• Rule 12:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 destination port 143
• Rule 13:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 protocol UDP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 destination port 135
• Rule 14:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 destination port 445
• Rule 15:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 destination port 1434
• Rule 16:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 destination port 4444
• Rule 17:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 destination port 4899
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• Rule 18:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 protocol ICMP
• Rule 19:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 source address 10.10.10.0/24
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 protocol TCP
• Rule 20:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 protocol HTTP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 destination address 10.10.10.79
• Apply to interface and commit:
Config# set interfaces ethernet eth1 firewall in name FWRULES-1
Config# commit
• To show firewall rules:
Config# show firewall name FWRULES-1
• To show interface rules:
Config# show interfaces ethernet eth1 firewall
By default, the virtual firewall rules are not stateful. The firewall has a default
drop rule that is active when a default action is not specified. To enable our stateful
rules and ensure that incoming traffic on eth0 for our test session is allowed. We




























4.5 Evaluation & Analysis
The virtual firewall was still working at an optimum performance with 99% mem-
ory utilization. The virtual firewall was responsive because of the resource sharing
management capabilities of virtualized environments. We then continue to flood the
virtual firewall with unlimited traffic generated from HOIC until the CPU Utilization
reached 71%, at which point the virtual firewall eventually became non-responsive.
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the virtual firewall resource usage during the attack
before it failed.
Table 4.2
Virtual Resources Usage - 8GB
Memory CPU - Hypervisor Monitored Packet Transferred
Total 8GB 4.66GHz >250GB of Packets
Used (%) 99.17% 71% -
Free (%) 0.83% 29% -
Fig. 4.3. Virtual Architecture Results
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Table 4.3




From these results and previous studies, we see that the virtual firewall does a
better job at responding to DDoS attacks than the traditional firewall, thereby making
it a better choice when it comes to mitigating DDoS and transferring the hardware
filtering services.
Fig. 4.4. Virtual Downtime & Recovery Time Analysis
4.5.1 Downtime & Recovery Period Analysis
Table 4.3 shows the downtime and recovery time of the virtual firewall after it
failed. The virtual firewall was non-responsive for about 12 seconds before it became
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responsive. It took about 28 seconds to recover back to its working state. The
recovery period was after the test was suspended. The recovery time for the virtual
firewall was better than that of the hardware firewall because the hypervisor was
responding; hence the virtual firewall doesn’t have to deal with hardware boot-up.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter starts by explaining Network Function Virtualization and introduces
the problems faced by virtualized architectures. We then highlight our virtual archi-
tecture set-up, its implementation and configuration, and conclude by explaining the




Our performance monitor is not the first performance monitor, or even the first
firewall performance monitor. But to the best of our knowledge it is the first to pro-
vide a means of mitigating DDoS attacks by monitoring firewall performance. The
paper visual firewall (C. P. Lee, Tros, Gibbs, Beyah, & Copeland, 2005) seeks to aid
the configuration of firewalls and monitoring of networks by providing four simulta-
neous views that display varying levels of detail and time scales as well as correctly
visualizing firewall reactions to individual packets. The four implemented views are:
Real-Time Traffic, Visual Signature, Statistics, and IDS Alarm. These views provide
the levels of detail that system administrators need to properly monitor their sys-
tems in passive or active manners. The paper visualized several attacks, and made
sure that individuals unfamiliar with networking concepts can quickly distinguish
between benign and malignant traffic patterns with minimal instruction. Another
monitoring paper (Yuan & Mills, 2005) proposes a method for early detection. Using
a few observation points, the proposed method can monitor the macroscopic effect
of DDoS flooding attacks and then inform more detailed detection systems when a
DDoS attack possibly arises in transit or source networks.
Others focused on packet monitoring in Cloud Environment to prevent DDoS
attacks (Chouhan & Peddoju, 2013) using Hop Count Filtering. The approach of
Hop Count Filtering provides a network independent and readily available solution
to prevent DDoS attacks in Cloud environments. The method decreases the unavail-
ability of cloud services to legitimate clients, reduce number of updates, and saves
computation time. The approach is simulated in a CloudSim toolkit environment and
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corresponding results are produced. Others monitored firewall traffic using Intrusion
Detection Systems (Asarcıklı, 2005).
However, none of these papers provided a mitigation solution to DDoS attacks
targeting firewalls in traditional and virtual environments. Hence, the birth of our
performance monitor as the first firewall monitor DDoS mitigation solution.
5.2 Performance Monitor Design
The performance monitor is mirrored to the hardware and virtual firewall. The
monitor runs on a dedicated system as a virtual machine. Based on the results
of both the traditional and virtual test, instructions were given. The monitor was
coded in python and the threshold at which the firewalls can migrate packet filtering
services was defined in the code. No GUI was used. The monitor connects with the
firewalls through their respective API’s. The communication between the monitor
and the firewalls is encrypted using AES. MySQL database was connected to store
the heuristics based on the defined thresholds. Figure 5.1 shows how the monitor
connects to the firewall.
When either the traditional or virtual firewall becomes overwhelmed during the
test, the monitor reroutes the traffic meant for the failed firewall to the other firewall,
thereby allowing the overwhelmed firewall to resume to its working state, hence,
downtime as a result of DDoS attack is minimized.
5.3 Implementation & Deployment
5.3.1 API Implementation
Implementing the API connections for both firewalls is based on the guide provided




Fig. 5.1. Performance Monitor Architecture
• REST Client establishes SSL connection to the firewall
• REST Client sends API request with basic authentication header to ASA.
• Firewall server validates and processes clients request.
• Firewall HTTP server opens the connection to REST Agent using a TCP chan-
nel, and writes the HTTP request to the REST Agent.
• Firewall HTTP server waits for REST Agent processs response.
• REST Agent processes API request, picks the session/user info, and invokes
CLI command requests to Admin handler listening on localhost port in Firewall.
REST Agent includes the session/user info in the request.
• Admin handler processes the CLI commands and collects the result output.
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• Admin handler sends the response for the CLI commands request to REST
Agent.
• REST Agent prepares the response for REST API request and sends to the
Firewall HTTP server.
• Firewall HTTP server forwards the response to the client. Server doesn’t process
the response received from the REST Agent process.
Basic Authorization header must be added to every REST API request and au-
thentication will be performed for every request. It is recommended to use Certificate
Authority (CA) issued certificates on the firewalls, so that REST API clients can val-
idate the server certificates of the firewalls during the SSL connection establishment.
The process of how the monitors API communicates with our firewalls is presented
in Figure 5.2
The communication between the firewalls and the performance monitor is estab-
lished using the firewall respective RESTAPI. REST stands for Representation State
Transfer. It is a term coined by Roy Fielding in his dissertation (Fielding, 2000) to
refer to a software architectural style. The REST architectural style describes six
constraints: Uniform Interface, Stateless, Cache-able, Client-Server, Layered System,
and Code on Demand. This constraint states that a REST API should be driven by
nothing but hypermedia. This is how a web browser interacts with well-behaved web
applications, where the browser transitions to different pages based on the selected
hyperlinks and actions present in the pages. Since HTTP has been used to transfer
information that is not hypertext, this constraint is often ignored by REST API de-
signs. Instead of defining API in terms of hypermedia, some so-called REST APIs
are modeled as a set of interfaces implemented by resources. Although this design
supports the REST uniform interface constraint, it inevitably creates fixed resource
names, types and hierarchies that violate the REST API design rules prescribed by
Roy Fielding (Fielding, 2000). This kind of violations leads to an API that depends
on the out-of-band information, instead of hypermedia, to drive the interactions be-
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Fig. 5.2. API Call Process
tween components (Li & Chou, 2011). To properly understand how RESTAPIs work
is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
5.3.2 MySQL Database Implementation
To store the thresholds and heuristic conditions used to migrate packet filtering
services between the firewalls, we used a MySQL database. To do that, we installed
the MySQL driver, because python doesn’t come with MySQL; by default, it comes
with SQLite. We installed the MySQL package. The implementation and use of
MySQL is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the commands we used to
install MySQL database in Ubuntu debian distros is:
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sudo apt-get install python-mysqldb
After installation, we then used MySQL inside python like any other package.







5.3.3 AES Implementation using PyCrypto
In other to secure the RESTAPI connection between the firewalls and the per-
formance monitor, an AES implementation of python using PyCrypto2 was used
(Buchmann, 2013; Ferguson, Schneier, & Kohno, n.d.; Katz & Lindell, 2014; Lindell,
2005; Schneier, 1997). This implementation is based on the guide provided in “A
Working Introduction to Crypto using PyCrypto” (Isom, 2011).
5.4 Performance Analysis
The performance monitor was analyzed by integrating it into the firewalls, by con-
ducting the same test, and flooding the firewalls with HTTP traffic. The performance
monitor proved to be effective after we surpassed the generated HTTP traffic that
flooded the hardware firewall, and the firewall was still responsive. However, consid-
ering that the virtual firewall has a better performance than the hardware firewall,
the operation was smooth. The packet filtering process of the hardware firewall was
transferred to the virtual firewall. The process by which the performance monitor
makes decision is presented in Figure 5.3.
2https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/api/2.6/
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Fig. 5.3. Performance Monitor/Migration Decision Flow
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5.4.1 Filtering Service Transfer
The monitor starts by checking the firewall states to see if there is an anomaly, then
it proceeds to make decisions; if the firewall is overwhelmed, it checks its parameters
and invokes the instructions that were defined, then transfers the filtering services.
If the firewall is not overwhelmed; it applies the firewall’s access list and continues
operation by proceeding to its designated destination.
5.4.2 Performance Comparison
Table 5.1 shows the performance results of the devices before and after using the
monitor. The memory utilization of the hardware firewall considerably reduced from
81% to 34% without the monitor. The CPU utilization reduced from 67% to 28%.
Table 5.1
Comparative Analysis of Performance Results
Architecture Mem Utilization CPU Utilization Packet Drop
Traditional 81% 67% 76.5%
Virtual 99.17% 71% -
Traditional with PM* 34% 28% -
Virtual with PM* 98.2% 73.6% -
However, for the virtual firewall, the change was a minimal decrease. The per-
formance of both Memory & CPU of the virtual device with the monitor connected
decreased from 98.2% to 73.6% respectively, compared to 99.17% and 71% without
the monitor. The performance decrease is as a result of the monitor being added
to the topology. This shows a success; most importantly, downtime was avoided,
considering none of the devices failed.
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Fig. 5.4. Comparative Performance Analysis
5.4.3 Thresholds & Heuristic Rules/SLA
Based on the analysis and thresholds identified from both firewalls, we defined
these heuristics and embedded them as part of the monitor’s instructions. These
are the actions the performance monitor does whenever one of the set thresholds is
reached. These rules can always be defined based on SLA if such topology were to
be adopted.
• For Hardware Instructions:
- If Packet Drops is high, then migrate packet filtering service to virtual
firewall, otherwise continue on hardware firewall.
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- If none of the defined heuristics is met, then continue packet filtering
services on hardware firewall.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a firewall performance monitor. The monitor con-
nects to two firewalls and injects instructions when certain conditions are met. We
discuss the design, implementation, deployment, and performance analysis. The per-
formance monitor is not a specific method of DDoS mitigation, but a means for
organizations to test their devices, by stressing them and finding the device thresh-
old, then using those thresholds to create a heuristic that can be used to configure the
monitor. We explain how the communication between the monitor and the devices
is encrypted using AES by utilizing the PyCrypto implementation of python. We
showed how the monitor stores data using the SQL database.
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6. CONCLUSION
6.1 Connecting the Dots: Justifying the Problem Statement
This dissertation focused on carrying out different types of tests to obtain the
results of the research objectives stated earlier. We implemented a monitor in a
secured architecture with two firewalls from different platforms, one using a virtual-
based and the other a hardware-based. The monitor monitors the state of the firewalls
and invoke certain instructions based on the firewalls state. Both the firewalls and
monitor are designed to work together in order to provide an optimized packet filter
architecture and minimize downtime when the firewalls become overwhelmed due to
a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. To achieve this, two different tests
(spike and endurance) at three stages were conducted. A web-server was built to
serve as the target of the HTTP traffic.
First we implement and test the traditional environment which consists of the
hardware firewall. We attacked the firewall using a HTTP flood DDoS attack to
find the hardware firewall weakness and define its threshold. Second, we carried out
the same test in the virtual environment, which consists of the virtual firewall. The
second test was also aimed at finding the virtual firewalls weaknesses and limitations.
That was achieved by flooding the firewall with a HTTP flood DDoS attack. The
firewall’s threshold was determined at the end. The last phase was implementing the
monitor that monitors the states of both firewalls.
The monitor was designed to switch packet filtering between the firewalls when
one of the firewalls reaches its threshold. Switching the packet filtering ensures that
downtime is avoided within the network, allowing the firewall to return back to its
stable state before the filtering processes resumes. The monitor monitors the firewall’s
state based on the heuristic rules fed to it. Those heuristic rules and threshold can
92
be defined based on SLA. Each organization uses different vendors when it comes to
network devices; hence, a standard threshold cannot be defined. Each device must
go through the same process, then define the threshold.
The threshold of each device was determined based on CPU Utilization and Mem-
ory Utilization.
6.2 Summary
In this dissertation, we looked into how DDoS attacks result in network down-
time, costing organizations billions of dollars. Ease of authorized availability and
access to information is one of the core foundation of computer security. According
to census.gov1, 97% of our day-to-day data, such as health information, education
information, etc. are all stored digitally, thereby making authorized access to such
data of paramount importance. DDoS attacks cause network downtime, making it
hard for authorized users to access to important data. We highlighted the main issues
with DDoS attacks in earlier chapters.
In addition, we test different network architectures and present a framework which
could be used to mitigate DDoS attacks and provide more up-time for computer
networks in chapters 3 and 4.
In chapter 5, we presented a framework that is used to mitigate DDoS and provide
more up-time in a network. We designed a tool (Firewall Performance Monitor) which
listens to the performance of the network devices and then executes instructions when
certain conditions are met.




6.3 Recommendations & Future Work
The framework we presented provides one of the first non-commercial approaches
to mitigating flooding attacks on firewalls and ensuring more network up-time. The
use of the monitor has shown promising results in enhancing network security systems.
Learning from this study, security administrators can optimize the performance
of firewalls in a network by first evaluating CPU utilization, Memory Utilization,
Packet Drops, and other available resources. Furthermore, security administrators
can implement the same methods we presented to ensure maximum network avail-
ability. Keeping in mind that the heuristics the monitor utilizes to make decisions is
dependent on the thresholds defined by the network devices, security administrators
can decide on each device threshold to meet its demands. The monitor’s heuristics
can only be defined based on service level agreements.
An interesting area of future research could focus on the monitor itself; considering
it runs as a continuous script with infinite max loop. It would be interesting to see it
developed as a software running with a simplified GUI, thereby making the heuristics
definition more simplified. Having the monitor run in a closedbox would be another
focus for future research; that would enhance control and limit access to the monitor’s
source-code, thereby ensuring greater security.
Another interesting area of future research is a broader application of same tech-
nique presented in this study; The monitor should be deployed other network devices
susceptible to DDoS attacks, and not just to network firewalls. It would be interesting
to apply the same method to a larger network, to deploy on a large-scale, real world
setting and analyze the results. With this approach, our monitor has the potential of
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A. FIREWALL ACL CONFIGURATIONS
Both firewalls are configured in transparent mode. Depending on the type of device
used, a guide on how to configure the firewall can be obtained from the vendor. Below
are the rules we used to configure the firewalls. We blocked all incoming traffic, and
only allowed authorized traffic to pass through (X represents public IP addresses, and
XX represents authorized IP addresses.).
A.1 Hardware Firewall
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any host X.X.X.X
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any host X.X.X.X
• Config# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 520
• Config# access-list 110 deny ip any host X.X.X.X
• Config# access-list 110 deny ospf any any
• Config# access-list 110 deny host X.X.X.X
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 21
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 22
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 25
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 110
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 143
• Config# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 135
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 445
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 1434
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• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4444
• Config# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4899
• Config# access-list 110 permit icmp any any
• Config# access-list 110 permit tcp any host XX.XX.XX.XX
• Config# access-list 110 permit tcp any host XX.XX.XX.XX
• Apply to inbound traffic on ethernet0/0 (outside interface)
• Config# access-group 110 in interface outside
A.2 Virtual Firewall
• Rule 1:
Vyatta# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 action reject
Vyatta# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 source address X.X.X.X
Vyatta# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 protocol TCP
• Rule 2:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 source address X.X.X.X
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 protocol TCP
• Rule 3:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 protocol UDP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 destination port 520
• Rule 4:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 source address X.X.X.X
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 protocol IP
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• Rule 5:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 protocol OSPF
• Rule 6:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 source address X.X.X.X
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 protocol TCP
• Rule 7:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 destination port 80
• Rule 8:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 destination port 21
• Rule 9:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 destination port 22
• Rule 10:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 destination port 25
• Rule 11:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 destination port 110
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• Rule 12:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 destination port 143
• Rule 13:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 protocol UDP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 destination port 135
• Rule 14:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 destination port 445
• Rule 15:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 destination port 1434
• Rule 16:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 destination port 4444
• Rule 17:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 action reject
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 destination port 4899
• Rule 18:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 protocol ICMP
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• Rule 19:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 source address XX.XX.XX.XX
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 protocol TCP
• Rule 20:
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 action accept
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 protocol TCP
Config# set firewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 destination address XX.XX.XX.XX
• Apply to interface and commit:
Config# set interfaces ethernet eth1 firewall in name FWRULES-1
Config# commit
• To show firewall rules:
Config# show firewall name FWRULES-1
• To show rules on interface:
Config# show interfaces ethernet eth1 firewall
A.3 Complete Architecture
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Fig. A.1. Complete Architecture I
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